Product Passport Requirements Mapping¶
This document is a working recognition and effect traceability matrix for Digital Product Passport capabilities in OpenETR.
It is based on a project-oriented interpretation of Digital Product Passport requirements supplied for review. It is not a restatement of legislation and does not assert that OpenETR satisfies any EU Digital Product Passport obligation by itself.
For the current EU legal and implementation context, including Regulation (EU) 2024/1781, Implementing Regulation (EU) 2026/1778, the EU DPP Registry, harmonized standards, and the sector rollout, see EU Digital Product Passports And OpenETR Regulatory Analysis Note.
The matrix is intentionally about recognition and effect. Those questions are technically outside the base OpenETR protocol, but they can be closely mapped to protocol evidence.
OpenETR should be treated as a signed evidence, digest identity, retrieval, and control-graph layer. It can show what was identified, signed, linked, retrieved, updated, attested, or queried. Product regulation, delegated acts, registry rules, access-control policy, market-surveillance practice, and relying-party decisions decide what legal, regulatory, or operational effect follows.
Mapping Table¶
| ID | Source area | Requirement group | Requirement statement | Project mapping / evidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| DPP-SYS-01 | EU DPP system requirements | Product Identification | The system SHALL assign or reference a globally unique, lifecycle-stable product identifier that is accessible through a physical or electronic data carrier attached to the product. | Outside the base OpenETR protocol. Product identifier assignment, uniqueness, lifecycle stability, and data-carrier attachment are the responsibility of the organization or economic operator that issues the Product Passport, subject to the applicable product rules. OpenETR can preserve evidence that an issuer asserted a product_id or related identifier in the Product Passport evidence record, and can link that assertion to the passport artifact digest, QR code, durable URL, and control graph. Recognition depends on whether the issuer and identifier scheme are accepted by the relevant registry, authority, marketplace, or relying party. |
| DPP-SYS-02 | EU DPP system requirements | Digital Product Passport | The system SHALL maintain a retrievable Digital Product Passport for each regulated product containing the information required for the applicable product category. | Partially supported as protocol evidence. The original Product Passport record, such as a PDF, image, JSON document, data bundle, credential, or registry export, is treated as the Digital Artifact. Its bytes produce the digest that identifies the passport artifact in OpenETR. Issuing the passport through the Product Passports workspace creates a corresponding signed Anchor Record for that digest, with optional domain metadata such as product_id, product_name, manufacturer, batch_or_lot, and record_description. OpenETR can also retrieve and render the original controlled record when configured storage contains the matching digest. The completeness of passport content required by a delegated act remains outside the base protocol and must be handled by the issuer, schema, registry, authority, or verifier policy. |
| DPP-SYS-03 | EU DPP system requirements | Data Accessibility | The system SHALL provide electronic, role-sensitive, machine-readable access to passport information for authorized parties while distinguishing public and restricted information. | Supported as profile-scoped protocol evidence, with access-policy limits outside the base protocol. In an OpenETR Product Passport profile, the authorized party is the organization that controls the recognized profile control key for that passport issuer. Only Product Passport evidence records issued by that organization profile should be recognized as authoritative for that issuer's passport. OpenETR can expose the signed control graph electronically and support machine-readable retrieval by digest or durable URL, but it does not itself decide public versus restricted passport content. Public/restricted access levels, API authorization, and confidential data disclosure rules must be enforced by the issuing organization, storage service, registry, or verifier policy. |
| DPP-SYS-04 | EU DPP system requirements | Lifecycle Support | The system SHALL support lifecycle updates and preserve passport continuity across manufacture, sale, repair, refurbishment, remanufacture, and end-of-life events. | Supported as linked evidence around the Product Passport graph, with lifecycle semantics defined by a Product Passport profile. The original Product Passport record can remain the primary Digital Artifact, while later original records, such as repair reports, refurbishment certificates, remanufacturing records, resale attestations, recall notices, recycling records, or end-of-life documents, can be associated through signed linked evidence records. Those records can point to their own digests and back to the original passport digest, preserving continuity across lifecycle events without rewriting the original passport artifact or treating every lifecycle update as a transfer of control. Recognition depends on whether the issuer profile, evidence type, linked document class, and lifecycle rule are accepted by the relevant delegated act, registry, authority, marketplace, or verifier policy. |
| DPP-SYS-05 | EU DPP system requirements | Data Integrity | The system SHALL protect passport information from unauthorized modification, support verification of retrieved information, and maintain traceability of updates. | Strongly supported as protocol evidence. OpenETR identifies the Product Passport artifact by digest, so any change to the original record produces a different object identity. Origin, control, and future linked evidence records are signed by OpenETR profile keys, giving verifiers cryptographic evidence of who asserted each record and whether the event signature is valid. Updates can be represented as additional signed records linked to the passport digest or to prior events, making the update path traceable without silently modifying earlier records. OpenETR does not prevent an external storage system from changing its own content, but digest verification reveals whether retrieved content still matches the recorded artifact. Recognition depends on accepted profile keys, verifier policy, storage integrity, and any domain-specific rule for whether an update is valid, superseding, or merely supporting evidence. |
| DPP-SYS-06 | EU DPP system requirements | Data Persistence | The system SHALL keep passport information available for the required retention period and SHALL avoid dependence on any single market participant remaining active. | Partially supported as durable evidence and digest-addressed retrieval, but not guaranteed by the base protocol. OpenETR can preserve the passport digest, signed Anchor Records, evidence records, linked evidence records, QR code, durable URL, and optional blob-storage references. These records can be mirrored across relays and storage services so the evidence graph is not dependent on a single issuer system. However, retention-period compliance and continued availability of passport content require operational storage policy, replication, backups, governance, monitoring, and possibly registry or authority involvement. Recognition depends on whether the storage and relay strategy satisfies the applicable product-category retention rules and whether verifiers can retrieve or otherwise validate the required passport information. |
| DPP-SYS-07 | EU DPP system requirements | Interoperability | The system SHALL use open interfaces, permit interoperability between independent implementations, and support standardized data formats. | Partially supported at the OpenETR evidence layer. OpenETR uses digest-based object identity, signed Nostr events, durable URLs, QR-code access, and machine-readable event tags that can be queried and verified by independent implementations. The same origin, control, and future linked evidence records can be interpreted by different domain adapters without changing the underlying graph. However, OpenETR does not itself define the full Digital Product Passport data schema, product-category vocabulary, delegated-act data model, registry API, or access-control interface. Those interoperability requirements should be handled by a Product Passport profile, standardized DPP schemas, registry interfaces, and verifier policy. Recognition depends on whether external DPP systems accept the OpenETR digest, event, storage, and profile conventions as valid supporting evidence. |
| DPP-SYS-08 | EU DPP system requirements | Searchability | The system SHALL allow authorized users to locate passport information using the product identifier and SHALL support automated discovery where required. | Partially supported for digest-based discovery, with product-identifier search requiring profile or registry support. OpenETR can query an object graph by passport digest and can expose durable URLs and QR codes for direct lookup. Product identifiers such as product_id can be included as signed metadata in the Anchor Record, but base OpenETR does not currently provide a complete product-id index or authorization-aware search service. A Product Passport profile or registry should define whether product identifiers are relay-queryable tags, registry metadata, external lookup keys, or all of these. Recognition depends on whether the lookup method is accepted by the relevant DPP registry, issuer, authority, marketplace, or verifier policy. |
| DPP-SYS-09 | EU DPP system requirements | Information Management | The system SHALL distinguish mandatory and optional passport data, support structured machine-readable data, and permit updates without invalidating unrelated information. | Partially supported as evidence structure, but the complete DPP data model is outside the base protocol. OpenETR can carry domain metadata in signed tags and can link structured artifacts such as JSON documents, credentials, registry exports, schemas, or future linked evidence records by digest. Updates can be added as separate signed records so unrelated prior records remain intact and verifiable. However, OpenETR does not decide which Product Passport fields are mandatory, which are optional, which schema applies, or which update supersedes a prior assertion. Those rules belong to a Product Passport profile, delegated-act schema, registry policy, issuer workflow, or verifier policy. |
| DPP-SYS-10 | EU DPP system requirements | Security | The system SHALL authenticate parties authorized to modify passport information, protect confidential information, and prevent unauthorized disclosure of restricted data. | Partially supported for signer authentication and integrity, but confidentiality and disclosure control are outside the base protocol. OpenETR events are signed by profile keys, so verifiers can authenticate which key issued an origin, control, or linked evidence record and can require recognized organization profile keys for authoritative updates. OpenETR should not place confidential passport content in public relay events. Restricted content should remain in controlled storage, encrypted payloads, private APIs, or issuer/registry systems, with only hashes, references, and permitted metadata exposed. Recognition depends on key governance, profile recognition, storage security, access-control systems, and applicable confidentiality rules. |
| DPP-SYS-11 | EU DPP system requirements | Governance | The system SHALL record the source of passport information, attribute information to responsible economic operators, and support regulatory inspection. | Supported as attribution evidence, with governance recognition outside the base protocol. Signed OpenETR records identify the profile key that asserted origin, control, or linked evidence information, and Product Passport metadata can name the manufacturer, issuer, product id, batch or lot, and related references. Linked evidence records can preserve who attached a document and what evidence type was claimed. OpenETR can make this evidence inspectable by regulators or verifiers, but it does not itself prove that a signer is a legally responsible economic operator or that the inspection package is complete. Governance effect depends on profile registries, organizational key controls, delegated-act rules, authority recognition, and verifier policy. |
| DPP-SYS-12 | EU DPP system requirements | Auditability | The system SHALL maintain an audit trail of significant passport events sufficient to reconstruct passport history. | Strongly supported as protocol evidence for the OpenETR graph, with completeness depending on domain policy. OpenETR origin, control, and future linked evidence records are signed, timestamped by event metadata, linked by digest and event references, and retrievable from relays or mirrors. This can reconstruct the OpenETR-visible history of the passport artifact, including issuance, recognized updates, linked lifecycle evidence, and relevant control actions. The base protocol cannot guarantee that every legally significant off-chain event was recorded. A Product Passport profile should define which events are mandatory audit events, which signer roles are recognized, and when missing evidence creates a warning, rejection, or non-recognition result. |
| DPP-REG-01 | DPP registry requirements | Registry Service | The registry SHALL maintain unique registrations and sufficient metadata to locate and identify Digital Product Passports without requiring storage of passport content unless required by law. | Mostly outside the base OpenETR protocol, but compatible with the OpenETR model. OpenETR can provide digest identity, signed Anchor Records, durable URLs, QR codes, and optional storage references that a registry can record as metadata. The registry can avoid storing passport content while still storing passport digest, product identifier, issuer profile, endpoint, status, and registration timestamps. OpenETR itself is not a full DPP registry service unless a registry layer is built around it. Recognition depends on whether the registry accepts OpenETR object digests and profile signatures as registration evidence. |
| DPP-REG-02 | DPP registry requirements | Passport Registration | The registry SHALL allow authorized economic operators to register passports and SHALL reject unauthorized, malformed, inconsistent, or duplicate registrations. | Outside the base protocol as a registry workflow, with OpenETR useful as registration evidence. A registry could require a signed OpenETR Anchor Record from a recognized organization profile before accepting a registration, and could validate the passport digest, product id, issuer metadata, endpoint, and signature. Duplicate detection could compare product identifiers, passport digests, issuer profiles, or registry-specific keys. OpenETR does not by itself approve economic operators or reject registrations; those are registry policy and authorization decisions. |
| DPP-REG-03 | DPP registry requirements | Passport Discovery | The registry SHALL locate a passport from its unique identifier and return the current passport endpoint through automated, machine-readable lookup. | Partially supported by durable digest lookup, but registry discovery is a separate service. OpenETR can expose direct lookup paths such as /etr/{digest} and can use QR codes to reach the control graph for a known digest. A DPP registry would still need to map product identifiers or passport identifiers to the current passport endpoint, OpenETR digest, storage location, or issuer service. Machine-readable lookup can include OpenETR event data as supporting evidence, but the registry remains responsible for product-id discovery, endpoint freshness, and authorization-aware responses. |
| DPP-REG-04 | DPP registry requirements | Economic Operator Management | The registry SHALL maintain authenticated economic operator identities, associate registrations with responsible operators, and track operator status. | Outside the base OpenETR protocol, but closely related to profile recognition. OpenETR profile keys can identify the signer of passport origin, control, and linked evidence records. A registry or recognition layer can map those keys to economic operators, organizational identities, certificates, accreditation records, or authority-approved accounts. Operator approval, suspension, revocation, and status tracking are not base protocol functions; they belong to a registry, trust registry, authority workflow, or verifier policy. |
| DPP-REG-05 | DPP registry requirements | Authentication | The registry SHALL authenticate registry users and API clients through secure authentication mechanisms. | Outside the base protocol. OpenETR provides cryptographic event signatures for records published to the OpenETR graph, but it does not authenticate users into a registry service or API. A registry can use conventional authentication, client credentials, organizational accounts, mTLS, OAuth-style flows, signed Nostr challenges, or other mechanisms while using OpenETR signatures as evidence for published records. Recognition depends on the registry's authentication policy and key-management controls. |
| DPP-REG-06 | DPP registry requirements | Authorization | The registry SHALL enforce role-based authorization for economic operators, competent authorities, customs authorities, Commission administrators, national administrators, and any other defined roles. | Outside the base protocol, with OpenETR able to supply signer and attestation evidence. Role-based authorization is a registry and governance function. OpenETR can expose which profile key signed a record and can support attestations or linked evidence from recognized parties, but it does not maintain a complete role table or enforce registry permissions. A Product Passport registry or policy profile should map OpenETR profile keys to roles and decide which roles may register, update, inspect, suspend, revoke, or attest to passport records. |
| DPP-REG-07 | DPP registry requirements | Access Control | The registry SHALL distinguish public, restricted, and administrative information and prevent unauthorized access to restricted or administrative information. | Outside the public OpenETR relay layer and primarily a registry/storage responsibility. OpenETR can make public evidence, hashes, references, and permitted metadata available for verification, but restricted or administrative information should not be placed in public events unless encrypted or otherwise protected. A registry, issuer service, or storage backend must enforce access control for protected passport content and administrative metadata. OpenETR can help verifiers confirm integrity of retrieved restricted content by digest once access is granted. |
| DPP-REG-08 | DPP registry requirements | API Services | The registry SHALL expose publicly documented programmatic APIs for registration, lookup, updates, validation, status queries, and interoperability with external DPP systems. | Partially supported only where the OpenETR app and CLI expose query, issue, QR, and retrieval flows. A DPP registry would need its own documented API surface for registration, lookup, update, validation, status, and external interoperability. OpenETR events and durable digest endpoints can be used as a lower-level evidence substrate behind such APIs, and API responses can include OpenETR digests, event ids, profile keys, signatures, and verification status. Registry API completeness remains an integration-layer requirement. |
| DPP-REG-09 | DPP registry requirements | Registry Metadata | The registry SHALL maintain passport identifier, product identifier, economic operator, current endpoint, registration status, registration timestamp, and update timestamp metadata for each registration. | Outside the base protocol as registry state, but OpenETR can provide several metadata inputs. Anchor Records can carry passport digest, product id, issuer/manufacturer metadata, record description, document type, event id, signer, and creation timestamp. Durable URLs and storage references can identify endpoints or retrieval paths. A registry should still maintain authoritative registration status, current endpoint, economic-operator mapping, and update timestamps as registry-controlled metadata. |
| DPP-REG-10 | DPP registry requirements | Availability | The registry SHALL provide continuous availability appropriate to its role and SHALL support fault recovery and preservation of registry records across failures. | Outside the base protocol as an operational service obligation. OpenETR can improve resilience by allowing evidence events to be mirrored across relays, exported, replayed, and verified independently, and by allowing original records or evidence artifacts to be stored by digest in replicated storage. Registry uptime, fault recovery, backup, disaster recovery, monitoring, and service-level commitments must be provided by registry operations and infrastructure. |
| DPP-REG-11 | DPP registry requirements | Audit | The registry SHALL record registrations, updates, authentication events, and administrative actions in tamper-evident audit records retained according to regulatory requirements. | Partially supported for OpenETR-published record history, but not for the complete registry audit log. OpenETR signed events can form tamper-evident evidence for passport issuance, control actions, and linked evidence records. A registry can reference OpenETR event ids and digests in its audit log. Authentication events, administrative actions, approvals, suspensions, revocations, and internal status changes require registry-side audit records, retention policy, and operational controls. |
| DPP-REG-12 | DPP registry requirements | Security | The registry SHALL protect registry data, communications, credentials, and monitoring systems against unauthorized access or modification. | Mostly outside the base protocol. OpenETR provides cryptographic signatures and digest verification for published evidence, but registry security includes transport security, credential protection, administrative controls, monitoring, incident response, database protection, and infrastructure hardening. OpenETR can reduce reliance on mutable registry state by making selected evidence independently verifiable, but it does not replace secure registry operations. |
| DPP-REG-13 | DPP registry requirements | Data Quality | The registry SHALL validate submitted registration data, reject malformed registrations, and detect inconsistent registrations. | Outside the base protocol as validation policy, with OpenETR useful as machine-checkable evidence. A registry can validate OpenETR event structure, digest format, signature validity, required tags, recognized issuer profile, product id, document type, endpoint, and linked evidence references. It can also detect duplicate or inconsistent registrations by comparing registry metadata and OpenETR graph data. The exact validation rules depend on delegated acts, registry schemas, Product Passport profiles, and authority policy. |
| DPP-REG-14 | DPP registry requirements | Administration | The registry SHALL permit authorized administrators to approve, suspend, revoke, configure, and monitor registry operations, and SHALL audit administrative actions. | Outside the base protocol. OpenETR does not administer registry operators, registry configuration, or service health. It can preserve signed evidence of authority notices, suspensions, revocations, warnings, or registry references if those events are modeled by a Product Passport profile or linked evidence record. Approval, suspension, revocation, configuration, monitoring, and audit of registry operations remain registry governance functions. |
| DPP-REG-15 | DPP registry requirements | Interoperability | The registry SHALL interoperate with independent DPP providers, support standardized identifiers and interfaces, and avoid requiring passports to be hosted by the registry itself. | Aligned with the OpenETR architecture, but registry implementation is required. OpenETR is naturally compatible with non-hosting registry models because the passport artifact can remain with an issuer, provider, registry, storage service, or holder while the digest and signed evidence graph remain independently verifiable. A registry can store identifiers, endpoints, OpenETR digests, profile keys, and verification references without hosting the passport content. Standard identifiers, registry interfaces, and provider interoperability must still be specified by the DPP registry ecosystem. |
| DPP-REG-16 | DPP registry requirements | Data Persistence | The registry SHALL keep registry records and historical registration information available for the legally required retention period. | Outside the base protocol as a registry retention obligation, with OpenETR supporting independent evidence preservation. OpenETR events can be mirrored, exported, and replayed, and passport artifacts or linked evidence can be stored by digest in replicated storage. A registry should still maintain registration history, endpoint history, status history, and economic-operator history for the required retention period. Recognition depends on registry retention policy, backups, relay/storage durability, and authority acceptance of mirrored or reconstructed evidence. |
| DPP-REG-17 | DPP registry requirements | Compliance | The registry SHALL support competent-authority inspection, customs verification, and regulatory reporting. | Outside the base protocol as a regulatory workflow, but OpenETR can provide inspectable evidence packages. The Evidence Graph can expose passport digest, Anchor Record, issuer profile, linked evidence records, event ids, signatures, timestamps, durable URLs, QR codes, and retrieval references. A registry or Product Passport profile can package this information for competent authorities, customs authorities, and reporting systems. OpenETR does not decide compliance status or produce complete regulatory reports without domain schemas, authority rules, and registry integration. |
| DPP-REG-18 | DPP registry requirements | Error Handling | The registry SHALL return standardized error responses, detect unavailable passport endpoints, and report invalid registrations. | Outside the base protocol as API behavior, with some useful OpenETR validation inputs. OpenETR-based services can detect missing events, invalid digests, signature failures, unavailable blob-storage records, unresolved durable URLs, malformed tags, and unrecognized profile keys. A DPP registry still needs standardized API error formats, endpoint health checks, registration validation errors, retry behavior, and reporting rules. Recognition depends on registry API specifications and verifier expectations. |
Mapping Guidance¶
Use the final column to point to concrete project artifacts, not broad claims. Useful entries should name:
- the relevant OpenETR route, command, service, template, or event shape;
- the signed event evidence that is produced or queried;
- the OpenETR profile, role, or external party expected to sign or attest;
- the identifier, digest, endpoint, registry, or storage behavior being relied on;
- the access-control, validation, persistence, or recognition rule being applied;
- any remaining legal, delegated-act, registry, or institutional dependency.
Examples of useful evidence references may include:
/digital-product-passports/etr/{digest}/etr/{digest}/qr/warehouse-receipts/queryopenetr issue-etropenetr query-etropenetr/services/control_events.pyopenetr/services/query_etr.pyapp/templates/digital_product_passports.htmlapp/templates/query_etr_result.htmldocs-site/product-passports.mddocs/specs/LINKED_EVIDENCE_RECORD_KIND_DESIGN_NOTE.md
Review Notes¶
This table is intentionally not complete yet. The next step is to review each requirement group and decide whether OpenETR:
- already has usable implementation evidence;
- needs a Product Passport domain profile;
- needs a registry or discovery integration;
- needs access-control or role modeling;
- should treat the requirement as outside the base protocol and leave it to the recognition layer.