Skip to content

MLWR Article Requirements Mapping

This document is a working recognition and effect traceability matrix for the UNCITRAL-UNIDROIT Model Law on Warehouse Receipts (MLWR).

It lists each MLWR article, gives a short project-oriented summary, and leaves a column for mapping OpenETR implementation evidence against the article.

The matrix is intentionally about recognition and effect. Those questions are technically outside the base OpenETR protocol, but they can be closely mapped to protocol evidence.

This is not legal advice and does not assert that OpenETR satisfies any enacted warehouse receipt law by itself. OpenETR preserves signed Evidence Graph records and derives consequential state under defined transition rules. It can show what was signed, linked, retrieved, transferred, pledged, discharged, presented, or terminated. Legal validity, authorization, protected-holder status, priority, enforcement, and local-law recognition remain questions for the relevant MLWR enactment, institutional rules, contracts, registries, courts, and policy profiles.

Primary source: UNCITRAL-UNIDROIT Model Law on Warehouse Receipts - English PDF.

Mapping Table

Chapter Article Article title Short summary Project mapping / evidence
I. Scope and general provisions 1 Scope of application Applies the law to warehouse receipts and defines a receipt as an electronic record or paper document issued and signed by a warehouse operator acknowledging goods and promising delivery to the holder. See Article 1 scope analysis. OpenETR fits as a domain-adaptable evidence and protocol layer for electronic warehouse receipt workflows, while leaving legal validity, operator authority, goods verification, and local-law recognition outside the base protocol.
I. Scope and general provisions 2 Definitions Defines key terms including depositor, electronic record, holder, negotiable warehouse receipt, non-negotiable warehouse receipt, protected holder, storage agreement, and warehouse operator. See Article 2 terminology crosswalk. The MLWR domain adapter uses warehouse-receipt terms in routes, page text, forms, and result sections, while mapping those terms to the generic OpenETR object, profile, event, control, participant, and lifecycle model.
I. Scope and general provisions 3 Non-derogation Provides that the Model Law provisions may not be varied or derogated from by agreement. See Article 3 non-derogation analysis. OpenETR can record agreed workflows, evidence events, attestations, and policy references, but those records do not let parties contract out of mandatory MLWR requirements.
I. Scope and general provisions 4 Interpretation Directs interpretation with regard to the Model Law's international origin and the need for uniform application. See Article 4 interpretation analysis. OpenETR supports this goal by keeping the core control model generic and portable, with MLWR-specific terminology isolated in the domain adapter and recognition rules left to local enactments or policy profiles.
II. Issuance and contents; replacement and change of medium 5 Obligation to issue a warehouse receipt Requires a warehouse operator to issue a receipt for stored goods when requested by the depositor under the storage agreement. See Article 5 issuance obligation analysis. OpenETR implements the evidence path for issuing a receipt Anchor Event, but the legal obligation to issue and the depositor request/storage-agreement conditions remain recognition-layer and policy-profile questions.
II. Issuance and contents; replacement and change of medium 6 Electronic warehouse receipt Requires a reliable method to identify an electronic receipt, keep it subject to control, retain integrity, establish exclusive control, identify the person in control, and transfer control. See Article 6 electronic warehouse receipt analysis. OpenETR provides signed, relay-queryable evidence for receipt identity, integrity, current controller derivation, and transfer of control, while reliability and legal recognition remain policy-profile questions under Article 7 and applicable law.
II. Issuance and contents; replacement and change of medium 7 General reliability standard for electronic warehouse receipts Sets a context-sensitive reliability standard for methods used under article 6, including operational rules, integrity, access controls, security, audit, accreditation, standards, and proof in fact. See Article 7 general reliability standard analysis. OpenETR supplies technical evidence for integrity, signatures, graph traversal, and local verification, but Article 7 reliability must be completed by the selected operational, governance, audit, security, and recognition policy.
II. Issuance and contents; replacement and change of medium 8 Representations by the depositor Treats a depositor's issuance request as representations about authority to deposit, authority to request the receipt type, and disclosed third-party rights or claims. See Article 8 depositor representations analysis. OpenETR can preserve signed evidence of depositor identity, requests, disclosures, and attestations, but the legal existence, truth, reliance, breach, and effect of those representations are recognition-layer questions.
II. Issuance and contents; replacement and change of medium 9 Incorporation of the storage agreement in the warehouse receipt Allows storage agreement terms to be incorporated or referenced in the receipt, subject to availability to transferees and inconsistency limits. See Article 9 storage agreement incorporation analysis. OpenETR can link receipts to signed terms, external references, document digests, schemas, and attestations, but whether those terms are incorporated, available, consistent, and effective is a recognition and document-effect question.
II. Issuance and contents; replacement and change of medium 10 Information to be included in a warehouse receipt Lists required receipt information, including receipt label, negotiability terms, parties, goods description and quantity, known third-party claims, storage period, storage place, unique identifier, issuance date/place, and storage-agreement date. See Article 10 required receipt information analysis. OpenETR can preserve required information as document content, signed tags, schemas, and attestations, but completeness and legal sufficiency are MLWR profile and recognition questions.
II. Issuance and contents; replacement and change of medium 11 Additional information that may be included in a warehouse receipt Allows optional receipt information such as insurance, storage fees, goods quality, and commingling of fungible goods. See Article 11 additional receipt information analysis. OpenETR can carry optional information as signed event data or linked documents, while effect, priority, reliance, and inconsistency remain governed by the receipt terms and recognition policy.
II. Issuance and contents; replacement and change of medium 12 Goods in sealed packages and similar situations Allows warehouse operators to qualify goods descriptions when inspection or verification is impracticable or commercially unreasonable. See Article 12 qualified goods description analysis. OpenETR can record warehouse-operator qualifications and inspection attestations, but whether a qualification is permitted or effective is a domain/legal determination.
II. Issuance and contents; replacement and change of medium 13 Loss or destruction of a warehouse receipt Provides a replacement process for lost or destroyed receipts and treats electronic loss as failure of article 6 conditions or loss of control. See Article 13 loss or destruction analysis. OpenETR can record signed evidence of loss, broken control, replacement, cancellation, and competing graph warnings, but the authority to replace a receipt and the legal effect of loss remain recognition-layer questions.
II. Issuance and contents; replacement and change of medium 14 Change of medium of a warehouse receipt Allows change between paper and electronic media, requires the prior medium to become inoperative, and preserves rights and obligations. See Article 14 change of medium analysis. OpenETR can record evidence that a receipt moved between paper and electronic media, but the workflow likely needs a dedicated medium-change event or profile rather than relying only on generic termination.
III. Transfers and other dealings in negotiable warehouse receipts 15 Transfer of a negotiable warehouse receipt Defines transfer for paper receipts by endorsement/delivery or delivery, and for electronic receipts by transfer of control. TBD
III. Transfers and other dealings in negotiable warehouse receipts 16 Rights of a transferee generally Gives a transferee the benefit of the warehouse operator's obligation and the rights the transferor could convey, subject to protected-holder rules. TBD
III. Transfers and other dealings in negotiable warehouse receipts 17 Protected holder of a negotiable warehouse receipt Defines protected-holder status based on valid transfer, good faith, lack of knowledge of adverse claims or defences, and ordinary-course business or financing. TBD
III. Transfers and other dealings in negotiable warehouse receipts 18 Rights of a protected holder of a negotiable warehouse receipt Specifies the rights acquired by a protected holder, with alternative formulations for rights in the receipt and goods, and shields against many prior claims, defences, and judgments. TBD
III. Transfers and other dealings in negotiable warehouse receipts 19 Third-party effectiveness of a security right Provides ways a security right in a negotiable receipt may become effective against third parties, including registry, control of electronic receipts, or possession of paper receipts. TBD
III. Transfers and other dealings in negotiable warehouse receipts 20 Representations by a transferor of a negotiable warehouse receipt Provides that a transferor represents receipt authenticity and lack of known impairing facts except as notified to the transferee. TBD
III. Transfers and other dealings in negotiable warehouse receipts 21 Limited representation by intermediaries Limits representations by known intermediaries to authorization to transfer, rather than the broader article 20 representations. TBD
III. Transfers and other dealings in negotiable warehouse receipts 22 Transferor not responsible for the warehouse operators' performance Clarifies that transfer alone does not guarantee the warehouse operator's performance. TBD
IV. Rights and obligations of the warehouse operator 23 Duty of care Requires the warehouse operator to store and preserve goods with the care expected of a diligent and competent operator, with limits on liability exclusions. TBD
IV. Rights and obligations of the warehouse operator 24 Duty to keep goods separate Requires goods covered by each receipt to remain identifiable, while allowing permitted commingling of fungible goods of the same type and quality. TBD
IV. Rights and obligations of the warehouse operator 25 Lien of the warehouse operator Defines the warehouse operator's lien for charges and preservation/sale expenses and limits the lien against protected holders. TBD
IV. Rights and obligations of the warehouse operator 26 Obligation of the warehouse operator to deliver Requires delivery to the holder or nominee upon delivery instruction, surrender of the receipt, and payment of qualifying outstanding amounts; requires cancellation after delivery. TBD
IV. Rights and obligations of the warehouse operator 27 Partial delivery Allows partial delivery on similar conditions, with notation of the partial delivery on the receipt and return of the receipt to the holder. TBD
IV. Rights and obligations of the warehouse operator 28 Split warehouse receipts Requires split receipts at the holder's request, covering the same total goods, upon surrender and reasonable costs; requires cancellation of the original. TBD
IV. Rights and obligations of the warehouse operator 29 Exoneration from delivery obligation Relieves the warehouse operator from delivery where goods are lost or destroyed without operator liability, disposed of through lien/storage termination, or delivery is prevented by court order or circumstances beyond control. TBD
IV. Rights and obligations of the warehouse operator 30 Termination of storage by the warehouse operator Allows the warehouse operator to terminate storage through notice, demand payment/removal, reserve sale rights, shorten periods for deteriorating goods, use public notice where needed, and dispose of hazardous goods. TBD
V. Pledge bonds 31 Scope of provisions on pledge bonds Provides that the optional pledge-bond chapter governs effects once a pledge bond is transferred separately from the warehouse receipt. TBD
V. Pledge bonds 32 Issuance and form of a pledge bond Defines pledge bonds as associated but detachable paper documents or separately controllable electronic records that represent a payment right and grant a security right in the goods. TBD
V. Pledge bonds 33 Effect of a pledge bond Makes the warehouse receipt holder's rights to goods subject to the pledge-bond holder's rights and provides payment/surrender and enforcement consequences. TBD
V. Pledge bonds 34 Transfers and other dealings Allows pledge bonds to be transferred with or separately from the receipt, requires amount/due-date information for first separate transfer, and applies negotiable-receipt transfer rules. TBD
V. Pledge bonds 35 Rights and obligations of the warehouse operator Requires both receipt and pledge-bond holders for splits and delivery before due date, and allows delivery against the pledge bond after due date. TBD
VI. Application of this Law 36 Entry into force Provides enactment timing and application to warehouse receipts and optional pledge bonds issued after entry into force. TBD
VI. Application of this Law 37 Repeal and amendment of other laws Provides placeholders for repealing or amending other laws as part of enactment. TBD

Mapping Guidance

Use the final column to point to concrete project artifacts, not abstract claims. Good entries should name:

  • the relevant OpenETR command, route, service, or event shape;
  • the signed event evidence that is produced or queried;
  • the profile or role expected to sign the event;
  • the validation rule, policy rule, or recognition assumption being applied;
  • any remaining legal, institutional, or local-law dependency.

Examples of useful evidence references include:

  • openetr issue-etr
  • openetr query-etr
  • openetr transfer initiate
  • openetr transfer accept
  • openetr encumber
  • openetr discharge
  • openetr redeem
  • openetr terminate-etr
  • /warehouse-receipts
  • /warehouse-receipts/query
  • /warehouse-receipts/issue
  • /warehouse-receipts/transfer/initiate
  • /warehouse-receipts/transfer/accept
  • /warehouse-receipts/encumber
  • /warehouse-receipts/discharge
  • /warehouse-receipts/redeem
  • /warehouse-receipts/terminate
  • openetr/services/control_events.py
  • openetr/services/query_etr.py
  • docs/specs/OPENETR_MLWR_PROFILE.md
  • docs/specs/MLWR_WEBAPP_DOMAIN_ADAPTER_DESIGN_NOTE.md

Article 1 Scope Analysis

Article 1 frames the MLWR as applying to warehouse receipts. It also establishes the basic concept of a warehouse receipt as an electronic record or paper document issued and signed by a warehouse operator, acknowledging receipt of goods and promising delivery to the holder.

The current OpenETR implementation should be mapped to Article 1 as an electronic-record evidence and protocol layer, not as a complete warehouse-receipt law.

Article 1 requirement / concept Current project evidence OpenETR generic mapping Assessment
Applies to warehouse receipts The dedicated MLWR web surface is rooted at /warehouse-receipts and presents workflows for creating and querying OpenETR control status for warehouse receipts, then transferring, pledging, releasing, presenting, or completing that control lifecycle. A warehouse receipt is represented as a Digital Artifact with an Anchor Record and related evidence records. Demonstrated at the domain-adapter level. The UI speaks MLWR warehouse receipt language while the service layer remains generic.
Receipt may be an electronic record examples/MLWR001.pdf and uploaded receipt files are accepted as receipt event data; the system hashes the file and uses the digest to derive the OpenETR object identity. Electronic record bytes become an object digest, o tag, and object reference queried through the generic OpenETR model. Demonstrated for document-backed electronic receipt evidence. A future policy profile should define canonical formats, accessibility, and retention requirements.
Issued by a warehouse operator The MLWR profile describes the warehouse operator as the issuer/obligor role; the MLWR page uses profile selection so the selected operational profile signs issuance and later actions. Warehouse operator maps to an OpenETR profile signer, commonly the author of the kind 1415 Anchor Event. Cryptographic signer evidence is implemented. Legal authority, licensing, custody, and operator qualification remain recognition-layer questions.
Signed by the warehouse operator Issuance through /warehouse-receipts/issue or openetr issue-etr <receipt-file> publishes a signed Nostr Anchor Event. Query output shows the issuer/profile that signed the Anchor Event. Nostr event signature on kind 1415 Anchor Event. Implemented as cryptographic signature evidence. Signature attribution, authority, and legal intent require policy and applicable law.
Acknowledges receipt of goods The current system treats the uploaded receipt document as the Digital Artifact. The MLWR create-record flow can also place a description in the generic record_description signed Anchor Event tag and shows it as Event Data. Goods information is not a base protocol primitive; it may be carried in named signed tags, the referenced receipt document, a schema-backed receipt payload, or later attestations. Partially supported as document and tag evidence. Not yet implemented as a full structured goods schema, inspection evidence, quantity validation, or warehouse custody attestation.
Promises delivery to the holder The MLWR page exposes presentation for delivery and completed delivery actions, and the query result derives the current holder/controller from the evidence-event chain. Holder maps to current controller; delivery-related steps map to redeem and terminate evidence events. Workflow evidence exists. The legal promise to deliver, defenses, and warehouse delivery obligations are outside the base protocol and should be handled by Article 26 mapping, receipt terms, and recognition policy.
Can support paper/electronic boundary The matrix includes Article 14 for change of medium, and the MLWR profile is document-format neutral. A paper receipt can be represented by a digest or replacement event process, but the current model is strongest for electronic event chains. Not yet fully implemented. Change-of-medium rules, making the prior medium inoperative, and replacement procedures require additional policy and event patterns.
Does not replace local warehouse receipt law OPENETR_MLWR_PROFILE.md states that OpenETR does not determine legal validity, goods existence/conformity, operator authority, protected-holder status, perfection, priority, liability, title, or final legal effect. OpenETR supplies signed evidence to a Recognition Layer. Explicitly documented. This is a design boundary, not a gap in the base protocol.

Article 1 therefore supports the current project framing: OpenETR can provide signed, inspectable evidence for electronic warehouse receipt workflows, while an MLWR enactment or recognition profile decides when that evidence has legal effect.

Article 3 Non-Derogation Analysis

Article 3 means the MLWR rules are mandatory within their scope. Parties may use contracts, platform rules, registry rules, policy profiles, and private workflows, but those arrangements cannot vary or derogate from the Model Law provisions where the Model Law applies.

For OpenETR, Article 3 is mainly a guardrail for how the project describes recognition. OpenETR may publish signed evidence of what parties did and what policies they referenced. It should not claim that a protocol event, profile setting, or private agreement can override mandatory MLWR requirements.

Article 3 requirement / concept Current project evidence OpenETR generic mapping Assessment
MLWR provisions are not privately waivable The MLWR profile states that legal validity, authorization, protected-holder status, perfection, priority, liability, title, and final legal effect belong to the Recognition Layer. OpenETR events are evidence inputs, not self-executing legal overrides. Aligned as a documented boundary. The implementation avoids claiming that publication alone determines legal effect.
Contracts and policy profiles may still provide context The MLWR profile lists contract terms, institutional policy, registry/platform rules, and attestation requirements as Recognition Layer inputs. Policy references, attestations, external references, and participant signatures can be linked to the OpenETR event chain. Supported as evidence architecture. A policy profile can add conditions, but it should not purport to waive mandatory MLWR rules.
OpenETR evidence events do not displace mandatory law Transfer, encumbrance, discharge, redemption, and termination events are published as signed control-relevant assertions. kind 1416 evidence events record actions; recognition remains outside raw event publication. Aligned. A relay-visible event proves that an action was declared, not that MLWR legal consequences necessarily follow.
Domain adapter should not expose waiver language The MLWR Control Desk explains that OpenETR records signed evidence while MLWR-style law, local enactment, registry policy, contract, and courts decide legal effect. The webapp is a domain adapter over the generic OpenETR service layer. Current language is consistent with Article 3. Future UI should avoid controls that imply users can opt out of MLWR mandatory rules.
Recognition profiles must respect enacted law Future policy profiles are listed as planned work for minimal demo, registry-backed, and secured-finance recognition modes. Recognition profiles should evaluate the OpenETR chain under a named legal/institutional policy. Not fully implemented. Future work should include a rule that policy profiles cannot mark mandatory MLWR requirements as waived merely because parties agreed.

Article 3 therefore reinforces the project boundary: OpenETR can make agreements, actions, signatures, attestations, and policy references inspectable, but it does not turn private protocol choices into a waiver of MLWR requirements.

Article 4 Interpretation Analysis

Article 4 directs interpreters to consider the Model Law's international origin and the need to promote uniformity in its application.

For OpenETR, Article 4 argues against embedding one jurisdiction's warehouse-receipt assumptions directly into the base protocol. The project should provide a portable evidence and control vocabulary that can be interpreted consistently across MLWR-style implementations, while allowing local enactments and policy profiles to supply the legally specific recognition rules.

Article 4 requirement / concept Current project evidence OpenETR generic mapping Assessment
Respect international origin The OpenETR MLWR profile is framed as an MLWR-style profile rather than a single-country warehouse receipt implementation. Base OpenETR concepts use generic terms: Digital Artifact, profile, Anchor Event, evidence event, participant, action, and lifecycle. Aligned. The model avoids making one domestic warehouse receipt regime the protocol default.
Promote uniform application The MLWR domain adapter translates warehouse receipt workflows into a stable generic event model instead of creating warehouse-only event semantics. kind 1415 Anchor Events and kind 1416 evidence events provide reusable wire-level shapes across receipt types and legal frameworks. Aligned. Uniformity is supported by using the same event primitives for issuance, transfer, encumbrance, discharge, redemption, and termination.
Keep domain vocabulary intelligible The webapp speaks warehouse receipt language in routes, headings, forms, and result sections. Domain terms are presentation-layer terms mapped to the generic service layer and wire model. Aligned. Users see MLWR concepts without forcing MLWR-specific terminology into the OpenETR core.
Preserve local enactment flexibility The MLWR profile states that local enactment, warehouse licensing rules, registry/platform rules, contract terms, and institutional policy belong to the Recognition Layer. OpenETR records evidence; recognition profiles determine whether the evidence is legally or institutionally effective. Aligned. This allows different MLWR enactments to interpret the same evidence under their own rules while still sharing a common evidence model.
Avoid overclaiming legal interpretation The docs repeatedly state that OpenETR does not decide legal validity, protected-holder status, perfection, priority, liability, title, or final legal effect. Raw event publication is separated from recognition under policy. Aligned. The protocol remains portable precisely because it does not hard-code legal conclusions.
Enable cross-domain reuse The domain adapter note says the same pattern can support electronic bills of lading, promissory notes, certificates, bearer-style presentation records, and secured finance records. The generalized OpenETR model can be reused wherever a Digital Artifact needs signed control evidence and queryable lifecycle state. Strongly aligned with Article 4's uniformity impulse. Reuse across domains encourages consistent interpretation of shared control concepts.

Article 4 therefore supports the project's layered design: warehouse receipt terms belong in the MLWR domain adapter; common control evidence belongs in the generic OpenETR core; legal interpretation belongs in the applicable recognition profile, enactment, or institutional rule set.

Article 5 Issuance Obligation Analysis

Article 5 concerns the warehouse operator's obligation to issue a warehouse receipt for stored goods when requested by the depositor under the storage agreement.

For OpenETR, Article 5 divides into two parts:

  • what the system can currently evidence: issuance of a receipt object by a selected profile;
  • what the system should not claim by itself: that the warehouse operator was legally obligated to issue, that the depositor validly requested issuance, or that the storage agreement conditions were satisfied.
Article 5 requirement / concept Current project evidence OpenETR generic mapping Assessment
Warehouse operator can issue a receipt The MLWR Control Desk can create an OpenETR evidence record for a receipt document at /warehouse-receipts/issue; the CLI exposes openetr issue-etr <receipt-file>. Receipt issuance evidence maps to a kind 1415 Anchor Record for a Digital Artifact derived from the uploaded receipt digest. Implemented as signed control-record evidence. The signer is the selected profile, commonly representing the warehouse operator or issuer.
Issuance is signed by the selected operational profile The webapp requires login and a selected warehouse operator or issuer profile before creating the initial OpenETR evidence record for a warehouse receipt. The selected profile supplies the Nostr signer for publish_issue_etr; query output can later show the origin signer/profile. Implemented as cryptographic signer evidence. Legal authority of that profile remains outside the base protocol.
Receipt object is tied to stored-goods documentation The current flow accepts an uploaded warehouse receipt document such as examples/MLWR001.pdf, hashes it, and records structured Anchor Event tags including name, digest_generated_at, and size_bytes. The document digest becomes the object identity used in the o tag and #o query filter. Document metadata is carried in signed named tags. Partially aligned. The system identifies the receipt document but does not yet validate goods existence, quantity, custody, or conformity.
Depositor request is required The MLWR profile identifies the depositor role and notes that workflows may issue directly to the depositor or transfer from warehouse operator to depositor. A depositor can be represented as a profile participant, transferee, or future attestation subject. Not yet implemented as a required issuance prerequisite. Future work should add depositor request evidence or an attestation/action type tied to issuance.
Storage agreement condition matters The MLWR mapping recognizes storage agreement as an external term or referenced document; the profile says recognition may depend on contract terms and institutional policy. Storage agreement evidence could be linked by a signed named tag, ref metadata, external document digest, schema-backed receipt field, or attestation. Not yet implemented as a dedicated issuance validation. Article 9 should define storage-agreement incorporation and availability more fully.
Issuance policy determines acceptable issuer and initial controller OPENETR_MLWR_PROFILE.md says issuance policy should specify whether the warehouse operator must be the issuer, whether the initial controller is the warehouse operator/depositor/another party, required operator metadata, and whether registry or authority attestation is needed. Policy profile over the OpenETR Anchor Event and profile metadata. Documented but not fully automated. Current implementation lets the active profile issue; future recognition profiles should enforce MLWR-specific issuance policy.
Legal obligation to issue is not decided by OpenETR The project boundary states that OpenETR does not determine warehouse operator authority, legal validity, goods existence/conformity, or final legal effect. OpenETR supplies signed evidence to a Recognition Layer. Explicitly aligned. OpenETR can prove an issue event happened, not that Article 5 compelled it or that refusal to issue was unlawful.

Article 5 therefore maps to OpenETR's Anchor Event issuance machinery, with an important boundary: the current implementation records signed issuance evidence, while the depositor request, storage-agreement entitlement, warehouse-operator obligation, and any sanctions for non-issuance must be handled by the MLWR enactment, storage agreement, registry/platform policy, or future recognition profile.

Article 6 Electronic Warehouse Receipt Analysis

Article 6 is the core electronic-control provision. It requires a reliable method for identifying an electronic warehouse receipt, keeping it capable of control throughout its lifecycle, retaining integrity, establishing exclusive control by a person, identifying that person, and transferring control.

For OpenETR, Article 6 is the closest MLWR fit to the generic control graph. The protocol does not declare legal control by itself. It produces signed event evidence that a verifier policy, MLWR recognition profile, registry, court, or relying system can evaluate.

Article 6 requirement / concept Current project evidence OpenETR generic mapping Assessment
Identify the electronic warehouse receipt openetr issue-etr <receipt-file> and /warehouse-receipts/issue hash the receipt file and publish a signed Anchor Record. The current wire format uses kind 1415 with an o tag as the object query anchor. The receipt is a Digital Artifact identified by a stable object digest and OpenETR object id. The #o relay query retrieves candidate Anchor Records and later Evidence Records for that object. Strongly supported as technical identity evidence. A policy profile should still define acceptable file formats, canonicalization, retention, and document presentation rules.
Keep the receipt capable of being subject to control throughout its lifecycle The query service retrieves Anchor Records and related kind 1416 Evidence Records by #o, groups them by candidate Anchor Record, follows e links, and derives lifecycle state and current controller. A Control Graph is built from an Anchor Record plus later Evidence Records linked to prior event ids. Lifecycle actions such as redeem and terminate are represented as signed Evidence Records. Supported as an event-chain model. Legal effect depends on the selected verifier policy and whether competing anchors, invalid transitions, or missing links are treated as warnings, rejection, or non-recognition.
Retain integrity of the electronic warehouse receipt The receipt bytes are represented by a SHA-256 digest; Anchor Event metadata such as name, digest_generated_at, size_bytes, record_reference, and record_description is carried in signed tags. Later Evidence Events reference the same object digest through o. Integrity is evidenced by digest equality for the receipt object and Nostr signatures over each event's tags and content. Structured event data lives in tags so verifiers do not need to parse free-form content. Strong technical evidence for document/object integrity. It does not prove that the described goods exist or that the PDF contains all Article 10 information. Those are domain-schema and recognition-policy questions.
Establish exclusive control by a person The current controller is derived from the accepted control path: origin issuer initially, then controller-changing initiate / accept transfer events. The generic verifier policy treats rule breaks as warnings or non-recognition annotations rather than deleting signed evidence. Exclusive control is evaluated by replaying a graph under policy: one active origin/control path, expected signer, expected prior-event link, expected participant, no accepted competing controller-changing transition. Partially supported. OpenETR gives the evidence and baseline warnings needed to evaluate exclusivity, but the final exclusivity conclusion belongs to an Article 6 / Article 7 recognition profile or relying system.
Identify the person in control Query results show the current controller npub, basis, and profile metadata when available. Profiles, aliases, root-and-profile identity, and known entities help map keys to operational identities without hard-coding legal identity into the protocol. A person in control maps to the current controller key/profile under the evaluated control graph. Identity recognition can be strengthened through profiles, known entities, NIP-05, TRQP, web-of-trust attestations, or external registries. Supported as cryptographic key/profile identification. Legal personhood, authority, licensing, and attribution remain recognition-layer matters.
Transfer control over the electronic warehouse receipt The CLI and MLWR web routes expose transfer initiation and acceptance: openetr transfer initiate, openetr transfer accept, /warehouse-receipts/transfer/initiate, and /warehouse-receipts/transfer/accept. Transfer events are signed kind 1416 events with action tags, p participant tags, o object tags, and e prior-event links. Transfer is a controller-changing transition in the control graph. The transferee is named in p; acceptance is signed by the intended transferee and linked to the prior transfer event. Supported as signed transfer evidence. Whether a transfer is legally effective, protected, blocked by encumbrances, or subject to additional warehouse/operator/registry consent is a policy question.
Continue until the receipt ceases to have effect or validity The MLWR page and CLI support lifecycle events such as redeem and terminate; the query result shows lifecycle state and outstanding encumbrances. The lifecycle state is derived from signed evidence events over the same object graph. Termination can end the active controller state for the graph under policy. Supported at the evidence layer. Article 13 replacement, Article 14 change of medium, Article 26 delivery, cancellation, and local-law invalidity still require additional domain policy and event patterns.

Article 6 therefore maps well to OpenETR's center of gravity: signed, queryable control evidence over a stable object identity. The remaining work is not to make the base protocol more legally assertive, but to define one or more MLWR verifier profiles that state which graph patterns are reliable enough to recognize as Article 6 control in a particular legal or institutional setting.

Article 7 General Reliability Standard Analysis

Article 7 gives the reliability standard for the methods used to satisfy Article 6. It is deliberately context-sensitive. Reliability may depend on operational rules, integrity assurance, protection against unauthorized access and use, system security, regular and independent audit, accreditation or supervision, industry standards, other relevant circumstances, and proof that the method actually fulfilled its function.

For OpenETR, Article 7 should be treated as the policy and operations layer wrapped around the signed control graph. The base protocol can make evidence portable and independently verifiable. It cannot, by itself, prove that an operator's key custody, account controls, governance, security, or legal recognition framework is sufficient.

Article 7 factor / concept Current project evidence OpenETR generic mapping Assessment
Operational rules for the electronic receipt method The system integration note describes multiple integration patterns: REST APIs, the installable Python component, CLI execution from shell, and protocol-level integration using the OpenETR wire format. The MLWR domain adapter translates warehouse receipt actions into generic OpenETR issue/query/control calls. Operational rules belong in an MLWR recognition profile or system rule book that states who may issue, transfer, encumber, discharge, redeem, terminate, attest, and verify events. Partially supported. The primitives are present, but a formal MLWR Article 7 operating rule book is still future work.
Integrity of the receipt and control history The origin file is hashed with SHA-256; Anchor Events and later Evidence Events are signed Nostr events; the o tag anchors object lookup; the e tag links each evidence event to a prior graph event. Integrity is checked by digest comparison, event signature verification, object-tag consistency, event-link traversal, and replay of the graph under verifier policy. Strongly supported as technical evidence. Article 7 reliability still depends on whether the verifier accepts the hashing, storage, relay, and canonicalization choices for the relevant context.
Prevention of unauthorized access or use Root-and-profile identity allows a root key to organize operational signer profiles; profile selection controls the acting signer in CLI and webapp flows; known entities provide a warning model for unfamiliar npubs. Access control is implemented by the host system and key-management practice. OpenETR records which key signed, but the surrounding system decides who may use that key. Evidence exists, but reliability depends heavily on integration controls: account login, secret storage, hardware/security modules, signing approvals, incident response, and revocation or replacement procedures.
Security of hardware, software, and communications OpenETR can run locally, through the Python package, through the CLI, through the demo REST/web layer, or at the protocol level against relay-backed events. It is designed so verification does not require relying on someone else's running code at time of performance. The signed event set is the durable evidence. Relays provide availability and discovery, while local verification can independently check signatures and graph structure. Architecturally favorable, but not sufficient on its own. Production Article 7 reliability should document deployment security, relay policy, backup, monitoring, signer custody, and software supply-chain controls.
Regular and independent audit The event graph is queryable by #o; verifier policies can enumerate Anchor Events and later Evidence Events, preserve warnings, and explain which transition was or was not recognized. Signed events can be exported, mirrored, or verified locally. Audit can be performed by replaying the event graph and retaining the selected verifier policy, relay sources, recognized profiles, warnings, and recognition inputs. Good evidence model for audit. A formal audit programme, independent auditor identity, audit frequency, and audit report format are not yet implemented as first-class MLWR artifacts.
Supervision, accreditation, or external standards The TRQP and Nostr Web of Trust notes treat registries, authorities, accreditation signals, and reputation as recognition inputs above the OpenETR protocol layer. Known entities can be used as a local trust list with warnings for unknown signers. Recognition inputs can be layered onto the control graph without changing the base wire format: TRQP, WoT, NIP-05, registries, institutional attestations, or jurisdiction-specific accreditation lists. Supported conceptually. OpenETR does not currently require a supervisory authority or accreditation registry; a domain policy should specify when those inputs are mandatory.
Fit with industry or institutional standards The wire-format spec defines regular event kinds, tags, and graph validation rules; the MLWR profile maps domain actions to OpenETR actions; the webapp follows a hypermedia/HATEOAS approach while keeping JavaScript minimal. Industry fit is expressed through domain adapters and verifier profiles rather than by hard-coding one legal regime into the base protocol. Directionally aligned. A mature MLWR deployment should publish its selected profile, event-kind/tag commitments, operating rules, and verifier outputs as a named standard or scheme.
Proof in fact that the method fulfilled its function openetr query-etr and /warehouse-receipts/query show Anchor Event data, matching evidence events, lifecycle state, current controller, profiles, and outstanding encumbrances. The CLI can publish and then query to confirm relay return and exact event matching. A verifier can inspect whether the specific event set actually identifies the receipt, preserves integrity, links the graph, identifies the controller, and supports transfer under the selected rules. Strongly supported as case-by-case technical proof. Final legal effect still depends on whether the selected policy treats the evidence as sufficient in the circumstances.

Article 7 therefore should become the home for explicit MLWR reliability profiles. OpenETR's core contribution is that the evidence can be independently replayed and checked. The Article 7 profile should then state the surrounding governance: approved signers, accepted relays or local stores, key custody rules, audit expectations, accreditation inputs, warning treatment, and conditions for recognizing a control graph as reliable.

Article 8 Depositor Representations Analysis

Article 8 moves from technical control into legal representation and effect. It treats a depositor's request for issuance as carrying representations about authority to deposit the goods, authority to request the receipt type, and disclosure of third-party rights or claims.

For OpenETR, this is mostly recognition-layer territory. The base protocol can record who signed what, when, about which receipt object, and with which references or attestations. It does not decide whether a depositor had authority, whether a disclosure was complete, whether a third-party claim existed, or what remedy follows if a representation is false.

Article 8 requirement / concept Current project evidence OpenETR generic mapping Assessment
Identify the depositor making or supporting the issuance request The MLWR profile defines the depositor as a party that may be initial controller, transferee, or attestation subject. Profiles, aliases, and known entities can identify the operational key associated with a depositor. Depositor maps to an OpenETR participant/profile. A domain policy can require the depositor to sign an issuance request, attestation, transfer acceptance, or external reference before recognizing issuance. Supported as identity/signature evidence, but not yet a dedicated depositor-request workflow. Legal identity and authority remain recognition questions.
Evidence of a request to issue a receipt The current create-control-record flow publishes a signed Anchor Event from the active profile and can carry structured event data such as record_reference and record_description. The MLWR profile notes that issuance policy may decide whether the initial controller is the warehouse operator, depositor, or another party. A future MLWR profile can model the request as a signed action=attest event, a pre-issuance reference, a required depositor signature, or an external document digest linked to the Anchor Record. Partially supported. OpenETR can store the evidence, but the current demo does not yet require a separate depositor request before receipt issuance or control-record creation.
Representation of authority to deposit goods Attestation events can be used for accountable assertions about the receipt, parties, goods, chain, or event. The MLWR profile identifies attestors such as registries, auditors, inspection services, licensing authorities, financing platforms, or trusted counterparties. Authority-to-deposit can be a domain-specific attestation type, signed by the depositor and optionally supported by warehouse, registry, or inspection attestations. Supported by the generic attestation pattern. Not currently enforced by the baseline CLI/webapp as a required Article 8 condition.
Representation of authority to request the receipt type The current model can distinguish domain actions and can eventually encode receipt attributes such as negotiable/non-negotiable status as signed event data or receipt schema fields. A domain policy can require the depositor to attest authority to request a negotiable receipt, non-negotiable receipt, pledge-bond workflow, or other receipt type. Conceptually supported, but the current implementation does not yet encode receipt type as a first-class structured field or validate depositor authority against it.
Disclosure of third-party rights or claims The system already supports encumber and discharge evidence events for claims affecting a receipt, and Anchor Events and later Evidence Events can carry structured references. Query output can show outstanding encumbrances. Known claims can be represented as signed encumbrance events, named signed tags, external registry references, or attestations linked into the object graph. Supported for later claim evidence and outstanding encumbrance display. Not yet implemented as a required depositor disclosure at issuance time.
Determine whether a representation is true, false, relied on, breached, or legally effective The generic verifier policy explicitly separates signed event enumeration from recognition effect. It can surface warnings, missing attestations, unknown entities, or policy failures without deleting the signed evidence. Representation effect belongs to an MLWR rule book, contract, registry policy, court, arbitral forum, or institutional verifier profile. Out of scope for the base protocol. OpenETR can make the evidence inspectable; legal consequences belong outside the protocol layer.
Preserve evidence for later disputes or recognition review Relay-backed signed events can be retrieved by object digest, mirrored, exported, and replayed locally. Attestations can point to specific events with e links and classify assertions with type or other domain tags. The evidence package can include Anchor Event, depositor/request attestations, warehouse/operator issuance event, disclosures, encumbrances, profile metadata, known-entity recognition, and verifier warnings. Well aligned as an evidence architecture. A production MLWR profile should define the required evidence bundle for Article 8 and when missing evidence produces warning, non-recognition, or rejection.

Article 8 therefore confirms the usefulness of OpenETR's boundary between control evidence and recognition. OpenETR can support depositor representations by recording signed requests, disclosures, references, and attestations around the receipt object. Whether those facts amount to Article 8 representations, and what effect follows, should be defined by the applicable MLWR enactment, storage agreement, registry or platform rules, and verifier policy.

Article 9 Storage Agreement Incorporation Analysis

Article 9 concerns the effect of storage agreement terms when they are included in, or referenced by, the warehouse receipt. It also raises questions about availability to transferees and what happens when incorporated terms conflict with the receipt.

For OpenETR, this is another recognition-layer issue supported by event evidence. The protocol can make a receipt, agreement, reference, schema, or attestation inspectable and cryptographically tied to a control graph. It does not decide whether a referenced term is legally incorporated, whether a transferee had adequate access to it, or whether an inconsistent term is ineffective.

Article 9 requirement / concept Current project evidence OpenETR generic mapping Assessment
Storage agreement terms may be included in the receipt The current create-control-record flow treats the uploaded receipt document as the Digital Artifact and records structured signed event data such as record_reference, record_description, domain, document_type, schema, and schema_digest where available. Receipt terms can live inside the document whose digest defines the Digital Artifact, or in a schema-backed payload whose digest and metadata are signed in the Anchor Record. Supported as document and metadata evidence. OpenETR does not parse the full storage agreement or determine whether embedded terms have legal effect.
Storage agreement terms may be incorporated by reference The wire format supports ref on applicable Evidence Events, and named Anchor Event tags can carry structured references. Attestation events can point to specific events with e links and carry a type describing the assertion. A storage agreement can be represented by an external reference, document digest, URL, registry identifier, agreement id, signed attestation, or separate Digital Artifact linked to the receipt graph. Supported as linkage evidence. A production MLWR profile should define acceptable reference forms, persistence requirements, and whether the referenced terms must themselves be hashed or signed.
Terms must be available to transferees where required The MLWR webapp query result shows receipt event data, control history, current controller, profiles, external refs, and outstanding encumbrances. The system can retrieve relay-backed signed events by object digest and display references for review. Availability can be evidenced by publishing references, hashes, attestations, or retrieval metadata in the signed event graph, but actual access to the referenced terms is a policy and system-integration responsibility. Partially supported. OpenETR can reveal that a reference exists; it does not currently prove that every transferee had practical access to the referenced agreement at the legally relevant time.
Incorporated terms may be limited by inconsistency with the receipt The generic verifier policy can enumerate signed evidence and flag policy issues without hiding the underlying events. The MLWR profile states that legal validity and final effect remain outside the base protocol. Inconsistency analysis is a domain/legal rule over the receipt document, agreement terms, event metadata, and applicable policy. The verifier can surface warnings or non-recognition annotations. Out of scope for the base protocol. OpenETR can preserve the materials needed for review, but it does not interpret contract terms or resolve conflicts.
Transferees and later holders need inspectable evidence openetr query-etr and /warehouse-receipts/query provide a state view for the receipt object, including event data, graph links, profiles, lifecycle state, and references. A verifier can package the Anchor Event, receipt digest, storage-agreement reference, related attestations, evidence events, profile metadata, and warnings for downstream review. Well aligned as an evidence layer. The next step would be an MLWR profile rule requiring storage-agreement references to be present, stable, accessible, and digest-verifiable before recognition.
The legal effect of incorporated terms is not determined by publication alone Existing docs separate OpenETR's protocol layer from the recognition layer. Signed events prove that a party published a reference or assertion; they do not make the referenced term binding by protocol operation. Effect belongs to the storage agreement, MLWR enactment, contract law, registry/platform rules, court or arbitral interpretation, and verifier policy. Explicitly out of scope. OpenETR supports evidence of incorporation, availability, and reliance, but not the final legal conclusion.

Article 9 therefore fits OpenETR as an evidence and linkage mechanism. The project can support incorporation by making receipt terms, agreement references, document digests, schemas, and attestations visible in the signed graph. The legal effect of those materials should remain with the relevant document, storage agreement, law, and recognition policy.

Article 10 Required Receipt Information Analysis

Article 10 lists information that must be included in a warehouse receipt. That includes the receipt label and negotiability status, parties, goods description and quantity, known third-party claims, storage period and place, a unique identifier, issuance date and place, and storage-agreement date.

For OpenETR, Article 10 is about document content and data sufficiency. OpenETR can preserve a receipt document by digest, carry selected structured fields in signed event tags, and link to schemas or attestations. It does not currently validate a complete Article 10 receipt schema or decide whether a given receipt is legally sufficient.

Article 10 requirement / concept Current project evidence OpenETR generic mapping Assessment
Receipt label and document type The MLWR webapp routes and create-control-record flow treat uploaded files as warehouse receipts. Signed event data can include domain=mlwr and document_type=warehouse_receipt. Domain-specific labels map to named signed tags and UI/domain-adapter language over the generic Digital Artifact. Supported as metadata evidence. A formal MLWR profile should require exact labels and accepted document types.
Negotiable or non-negotiable status The current workflows emphasize transferable control but do not yet encode negotiable/non-negotiable status as a first-class structured field. Negotiability could be a signed tag, schema field, receipt-document term, or recognition-policy constraint that enables or restricts transfer actions. Not yet implemented as a validation rule. OpenETR can carry the data, but a profile must define how it controls transfer recognition.
Parties such as warehouse operator, depositor, and holder Profiles, aliases, root-and-profile identity, known entities, and query output identify signers, current controller, transferees, beneficiaries, obligors, and related profile metadata. Parties map to OpenETR profiles/participants and action-specific tags such as p, plus profile metadata and recognition inputs. Supported as cryptographic participant evidence. Legal identity and role qualification remain recognition-layer questions.
Goods description and quantity The MLWR create-control-record flow can carry a description using record_description; the receipt document itself is hashed and preserved as the Digital Artifact. Goods data can live in the receipt document, signed named tags, a schema-backed payload, or later attestations. Partially supported. There is no complete structured goods schema, quantity validation, grading model, or custody/inspection rule yet.
Known third-party rights or claims encumber and discharge events support claim evidence affecting a receipt. Query output can show outstanding encumbrances. Claims map to signed evidence events, references, attestations, external registries, or receipt fields linked to the object graph. Supported for event-chain claim evidence. Article 10 issuance-time disclosure requirements need a domain profile rule.
Storage period, storage place, unique identifier, issuance date/place, and storage-agreement date Current Anchor Events record document metadata such as name, size, digest generation time, and receipt reference. Profile metadata can include address. Additional fields can be carried in signed tags or a schema-backed receipt payload. Required receipt data should be represented as named signed tags or a canonical receipt schema, with the receipt digest anchoring the exact document. Not yet complete. OpenETR has the mechanism, but the project does not yet enforce all Article 10 fields or canonical field names.
Completeness and legal sufficiency of required information The generic verifier policy can enumerate evidence and warn about missing fields or missing attestations under a selected policy. Article 10 compliance should be a domain verifier profile over receipt content, tags, schemas, profile metadata, and attestations. Out of scope for the base protocol. The right next step is a machine-checkable MLWR receipt schema and verifier rule set.

Article 10 therefore points to a useful next layer: an MLWR receipt data profile. OpenETR already supplies the signed document and event substrate, but the required warehouse receipt information should be defined in a schema and checked by a domain verifier before recognition.

Article 11 Additional Receipt Information Analysis

Article 11 permits additional information to be included in a warehouse receipt, such as insurance, storage fees, goods quality, or commingling of fungible goods.

For OpenETR, Article 11 is similar to Article 10 but less mandatory. The protocol can carry optional information as signed tags, schema fields, linked documents, or attestations. The legal effect of optional information remains a matter for the receipt, storage agreement, applicable law, and recognition policy.

Article 11 requirement / concept Current project evidence OpenETR generic mapping Assessment
Optional information may be included The wire format supports named tags that do not need to be relay-queryable, and the MLWR adapter already uses generic tags such as record_reference and record_description. Optional domain information can be added as signed named tags, schema-backed fields, external references, or attestations. Supported as an extensible evidence pattern. A profile should define approved optional fields to avoid ad hoc incompatible tags.
Insurance, fees, quality, and commingling information Current implementation does not define first-class fields for insurance, storage charges, goods quality, or commingling. These can be modeled as receipt schema fields, record_* domain tags, agreement references, attestation types, or external registry references. Mechanism exists, but domain modeling is not yet complete. These fields should be part of a future MLWR schema/profile.
Optional information may affect reliance or later dealings Query output can expose event data, references, profile metadata, encumbrances, and lifecycle state; verifier policy can annotate warnings or recognition effects. Optional data can become policy input for transfer, encumbrance, redemption, delivery, protected-holder analysis, or dispute review. Supported as evidence input. Effect depends on the selected MLWR/legal/institutional rule book.
Optional terms may conflict with mandatory receipt information or law Existing docs keep legal validity and final effect in the Recognition Layer. Verifier policies can surface policy failures without hiding signed events. Inconsistency or invalid optional terms should be handled by a domain verifier or legal rule, not by the base wire format. Out of scope for OpenETR core. The signed data remains visible even if a policy refuses to recognize its effect.

Article 11 therefore reinforces the domain-adapter approach. OpenETR can carry optional receipt information without bloating the base protocol. The MLWR profile should decide which optional fields are supported, how they are encoded, and what recognition effect they may have.

Article 12 Qualified Goods Description Analysis

Article 12 addresses sealed packages and similar situations where a warehouse operator may qualify the description of goods because inspection or verification is impracticable or commercially unreasonable.

For OpenETR, this is a document-content and attestation issue. OpenETR can record the warehouse operator's qualified statement, link inspection evidence, and preserve later attestations. It does not decide whether the qualification was justified, commercially reasonable, or legally effective.

Article 12 requirement / concept Current project evidence OpenETR generic mapping Assessment
Warehouse operator may qualify goods description The receipt document can contain qualified goods language, and signed event data can carry record_description or future structured goods fields. A qualification can be represented as receipt text, a named signed tag, a schema field, or an attest event with a domain-specific type. Supported as evidence. The current implementation does not yet define a formal qualification field or validation rule.
Inspection or verification may be impracticable or commercially unreasonable The MLWR profile recognizes inspection services, auditors, registries, and other attestors as possible evidence sources. Practical limits on inspection can be documented through warehouse-operator attestations, inspection attestations, external references, or receipt schema fields. Conceptually supported. The legal threshold for impracticability or commercial reasonableness is outside the base protocol.
Qualified description should remain visible to transferees and verifiers Query output exposes receipt event data, graph history, references, profiles, and related evidence events. A verifier can present the qualified description, supporting attestations, and warnings as part of the evidence package. Supported if the qualification is encoded in the document, tags, or linked attestations. A future UI/profile should make these qualifications prominent.
Effect of the qualification on warehouse responsibility or holder rights Existing recognition-boundary docs state that OpenETR does not determine warehouse obligations, liability, protected-holder status, title, or final legal effect. Legal effect belongs to the MLWR enactment, receipt terms, storage agreement, court/arbitral interpretation, and verifier policy. Out of scope for OpenETR core. OpenETR preserves evidence for the analysis but does not resolve the legal consequence.

Article 12 therefore fits OpenETR as an accountable evidence layer for qualified descriptions and inspection limits. The likely implementation path is to add MLWR schema fields or attestation types for goods description, quantity, package status, inspection basis, and qualification text, then let a domain verifier decide whether the qualification is acceptable.

Article 13 Loss or Destruction Analysis

Article 13 concerns lost or destroyed warehouse receipts. For electronic receipts, the important analogue is failure of the Article 6 control conditions or loss of control. The article also points toward replacement procedures and safeguards against two receipts operating for the same goods at the same time.

For OpenETR, Article 13 should be handled as a replacement and recognition workflow over signed evidence. The base protocol can show that an event graph exists, that links are broken, that a control chain has been terminated, that a replacement was issued, or that competing origins exist for the same underlying object. It does not decide by itself that a receipt was legally lost, that a replacement should be issued, or that the old receipt is legally inoperative.

Article 13 requirement / concept Current project evidence OpenETR generic mapping Assessment
Loss or destruction of a paper receipt OpenETR is strongest for electronic receipt evidence, but a paper receipt can be represented by a document digest, external reference, or attestation linked to a digital artifact. Paper loss can be evidenced by signed attestations from the holder, warehouse operator, registry, court, or other authority. Supported only as evidence. The legal procedure for replacing a paper receipt is outside the base protocol.
Electronic loss as failure of Article 6 conditions or loss of control The verifier can query Anchor Events and later Evidence Events by #o, follow e links, verify signatures, derive current controller, and surface broken links, missing events, competing origins, or ambiguous chains. Electronic loss maps to a verifier-policy conclusion that the control method no longer satisfies identity, integrity, exclusive control, controller identification, or transferability requirements. Partially supported. OpenETR can expose the evidence and warnings, but a domain policy must decide when a failure amounts to legal loss.
Replacement receipt process The current system can issue a new Anchor Event and can terminate or annotate an existing graph, but it does not yet define a first-class MLWR replacement action or replacement relationship. A replacement could be modeled as a new Anchor Event linked to the prior receipt object or prior event, plus terminate, attest, or future replace action events signed by required parties. Not yet complete. A future MLWR profile should define replacement event shape, required signers, notices, indemnity, waiting periods, and recognition effects.
Prevent two effective receipts for the same goods The generic verifier policy can show multiple Anchor Events, competing chains, duplicate issuance, and warnings rather than hiding signed evidence. Regular event kinds preserve event history rather than replacing prior events. A verifier can treat competing origins or replacement-without-termination as warning, pending review, or non-recognition under policy. Supported as graph visibility. Legal exclusivity between original and replacement receipts requires a domain rule and likely warehouse/operator or registry attestation.
Make the old receipt inoperative after replacement Lifecycle events such as terminate can mark a graph as ended; attestations can reference specific prior events with e links; query output can show lifecycle state. Inoperativeness can be represented by a signed termination/cancellation event plus a replacement reference and policy recognition rule. Mechanism exists, but there is no dedicated Article 13 cancellation/replacement workflow yet.
Evidence for court, registry, warehouse, or platform review Relay-backed signed events can be retrieved, mirrored, exported, and replayed locally. Verifier output can preserve warnings, current controller derivation, outstanding encumbrances, and profile metadata. The evidence package can include the original Anchor Event, control graph, loss attestations, replacement event, cancellation event, registry/court attestations, and verifier policy result. Well aligned as evidence architecture. Recognition and remedies remain with the applicable MLWR enactment, registry/platform rules, court, arbitral forum, or institutional policy.

Article 13 therefore exposes a concrete design gap: OpenETR already has the graph and evidence tools needed to show loss-of-control conditions, competing receipts, cancellation evidence, and replacement evidence, but it does not yet define the MLWR replacement rule set. The missing piece is a domain profile that defines who may declare loss, who may authorize replacement, how the old receipt is made inoperative, and how verifiers treat the original and replacement graphs. A design note is now in progress at MLWR_RECEIPT_REPLACEMENT_AND_LOSS_PROFILE.md.

Article 14 Change of Medium Analysis

Article 14 concerns changing a warehouse receipt from paper to electronic form, or from electronic to paper form. It requires the prior medium to become inoperative while preserving the rights and obligations associated with the receipt.

For OpenETR, Article 14 is close to Article 13 but not identical. Article 13 is about loss, destruction, or replacement after failure. Article 14 is a deliberate migration between media. That means the event record should not merely say that the old graph ended. It should also identify the new medium, link the old and new receipt representations, and preserve evidence that the prior medium was made inoperative under policy.

Article 14 requirement / concept Current project evidence OpenETR generic mapping Assessment
Change from paper to electronic receipt A paper receipt can be represented by a digest, external reference, scanned document, registry id, or attestation. An electronic receipt document can then be represented in OpenETR as a Digital Artifact with an Anchor Record. Paper-to-electronic conversion could be modeled as a signed medium-change declaration plus a new electronic Anchor Record linked to the paper receipt reference. Mechanism exists as evidence, but no first-class change-of-medium workflow is implemented.
Change from electronic to paper receipt OpenETR can terminate or annotate an electronic graph and record attestations or references to a paper receipt issued by the warehouse operator. Electronic-to-paper conversion could be modeled as a signed medium-change declaration, a lifecycle event marking the electronic graph inoperative, and a reference to the paper receipt identifier. Partially supported by terminate, attest, and ref, but those are not expressive enough on their own to make the legal medium-change reason clear.
Prior medium must become inoperative The current terminate action can end lifecycle state under policy, and attestations can reference prior events with e links. Inoperativeness should be represented by a signed event that states the old medium is no longer operative because of a recognized medium change, not merely because the receipt was redeemed, cancelled, or otherwise ended. A dedicated action or subtype is likely needed. terminate alone is too generic unless paired with a required type=change_medium attestation or equivalent profile rule.
Rights and obligations should be preserved Query output can show the Anchor Event, control chain, current controller, encumbrances, profile metadata, and references. Outstanding encumbrances and control state can be used as evidence for what should carry forward. A verifier should compare the old and new representations and carry forward recognized state such as controller, claims, storage terms, and warehouse obligations according to policy. Supported as evidence, but not currently automated. A domain profile must define what carries over and how conflicts are treated.
Link old and new representations OpenETR supports event references with e, object lookup with o, external references with ref, and named tags for structured metadata. A medium-change event should probably include old object id/digest, old medium, new object id/digest or paper identifier, new medium, authority/signers, and references to supporting documents or registry records. The wire-format tools exist, but the project has not yet defined canonical tags or event shape for medium changes.
Keep paper receipts queryable after medium change Even when the operative medium is paper, OpenETR can keep a signed lookup trail for the receipt identifier, paper reference, prior electronic object, and medium-change event. A verifier should be able to query the known paper receipt reference or related electronic object and determine whether the paper record is currently active, superseded, or linked to an electronic successor. This is an important design requirement for change_medium: paper should not mean invisible to the protocol layer.
Prevent both media from being treated as active The verifier can surface multiple origins, competing graphs, lifecycle state, and policy warnings. A medium-change verifier rule should recognize only one operative medium at a time and warn if both paper and electronic representations appear active. Not currently implemented. This is a verifier-policy requirement for an MLWR change-of-medium profile.

Article 14 therefore suggests that OpenETR should add an explicit change_medium concept. This could be implemented as a new action=change_medium, or as a stricter MLWR profile pattern using attest plus terminate. My recommendation is to design a dedicated medium-change event shape, because Article 14 needs to distinguish conversion from ordinary termination, loss replacement, redemption, or cancellation.

The paper side should remain discoverable. If the current operative medium is paper, OpenETR should still be able to answer whether that paper receipt is the active record, whether it was converted from an electronic record, whether it has later been converted back to electronic form, and which signed event or authority supports that state.

A design note for this profile is now in progress at MLWR_CHANGE_OF_MEDIUM_PROFILE.md.

Article 2 Terminology Crosswalk

Article 2 is where the MLWR vocabulary starts to become implementation vocabulary.

The current project deliberately keeps three levels separate:

  • MLWR domain language used by the warehouse receipts webapp;
  • generic OpenETR concepts used by the CLI, service layer, and event model;
  • legal conclusions that remain outside the protocol and must be made by an MLWR enactment, institutional rule set, registry, contract, or policy profile.
MLWR Article 2 term MLWR-domain usage in this project Generic OpenETR mapping Current implementation evidence Boundary / gap
Warehouse receipt The webapp presents a warehouse receipt as the controlled document whose OpenETR control status can be created, queried, transferred, pledged, released, presented, and completed. Digital Artifact identified by a digest and OpenETR object id; the Anchor Record establishes the first signed OpenETR record for that object. /warehouse-receipts, /warehouse-receipts/issue, /warehouse-receipts/query; openetr issue-etr; openetr query-etr; publish_issue_etr; build_query_etr_result; kind 1415. OpenETR identifies and tracks a receipt object, but does not issue the receipt document itself and does not yet parse or validate a full structured Article 10 receipt schema.
Electronic record Uploaded PDF or other receipt representation is treated as the Digital Artifact whose digest is used as the stable object identity. File/document bytes become a sha256 digest; the digest maps to the o tag and object reference. Structured source metadata is carried in signed named tags. examples/MLWR001.pdf; web upload flows; openetr issue-etr <receipt-file>; query filters over #o; Anchor Event tags such as name, digest_generated_at, and size_bytes. The protocol is document-format neutral. Accessibility, storage, rendering, and canonicalization rules must be specified by a policy profile.
Warehouse operator The MLWR page and profile docs use warehouse operator as the issuer/obligor role for warehouse receipt workflows. Operational profile signer; commonly Anchor Event author, obligor participant, attestor, or terminating party depending on action. Profile selection on /warehouse-receipts; OPENETR_MLWR_PROFILE.md role mapping; signer_npub; publish_issue_etr; profile-backed signing. OpenETR proves which profile signed. It does not itself prove legal licensing, authority, custody, or warehouse status.
Depositor The MLWR profile treats depositor as the person depositing goods or on whose behalf goods are stored. Participant/profile that may be initial controller, transferee, or attestation subject depending on the configured workflow. OPENETR_MLWR_PROFILE.md role mapping; profile aliases; transfer commands and routes using participant profiles. Current UI does not yet expose a dedicated depositor field or depositor representation event.
Holder The MLWR page uses current holder / controller for the party shown as controlling the receipt. Derived current controller from the evaluated OpenETR Anchor Event and later Evidence Event chain. warehouse_receipt_result.html; openetr query-etr; build_query_etr_result; transfer initiate/accept events; current-controller summary. OpenETR can derive current controller evidence. Legal holder status and protected-holder status remain recognition-layer conclusions.
Protected holder The MLWR profile identifies protected-holder status as a legal recognition question. Not a base protocol state; should be represented by policy evaluation, attestation, or recognition output over the event chain. OPENETR_MLWR_PROFILE.md; query output provides the evidence needed for later evaluation: origin, transfers, profiles, control history, encumbrances. Not implemented as a final legal determination. Future work should define protected-holder policy checks and supporting attestations.
Negotiable warehouse receipt The domain adapter can present and transfer a receipt as a transferable warehouse receipt workflow. Digital Artifact whose control can be transferred through generic OpenETR evidence events. /warehouse-receipts/transfer/initiate; /warehouse-receipts/transfer/accept; openetr transfer initiate; openetr transfer accept; kind 1416 action=initiate/accept. The current implementation does not yet encode negotiable vs non-negotiable as a structured receipt attribute.
Non-negotiable warehouse receipt The MLWR table recognizes this term, but the current MLWR page is focused on control and transfer workflows. Could be represented as a Digital Artifact with policy rules that disable or restrict transfer actions. Generic controls exist, but no dedicated non-negotiable policy profile is implemented yet. Needs structured receipt metadata or recognition policy to prevent treating a non-negotiable receipt as freely transferable.
Storage agreement The MLWR profile treats storage terms as external terms that may be referenced by a receipt or attestation. External reference, receipt payload field, signed named tag, or attestation linked to the Digital Artifact. OPENETR_MLWR_PROFILE.md; ref and type metadata on Evidence Events; Anchor Event tags can identify document name, digest generation time, size, receipt reference, goods description, and related domain context. No dedicated storage-agreement schema or incorporation validation yet. Article 9 mapping should define this more fully.
Goods The receipt document represents goods stored with the warehouse operator; the app currently tracks the receipt while allowing a goods description to be carried in the generic record_description Anchor Event tag. Goods information can be represented as signed named event data, receipt document content, a future schema-backed payload, or attestation linked to the Digital Artifact. examples/MLWR001.pdf; Event Data; record_description tag; receipt digest/object id in query result. No current structured goods schema, inspection data, quantity validation, or commingling model.
Control The MLWR domain uses holder/controller language and transfer of receipt control. Current controller derived from origin and kind 1416 evidence events; transfer uses initiate and accept; encumbrances do not change controller by themselves. build_query_etr_result; /warehouse-receipts/query; control history; openetr transfer initiate; openetr transfer accept; openetr encumber; openetr discharge. Legal exclusivity and reliability of control are Article 6 and 7 questions; OpenETR provides evidence for that analysis.
Signature / signed by warehouse operator The MLWR adapter requires the selected profile to sign initial and later OpenETR evidence records. Nostr event signature by the selected OpenETR profile key. Profile selection; signer_npub; whoami; profile show; Nostr kind 1415 and kind 1416 signed events. Signature evidence is cryptographic. Legal attribution, authority, and intent still require policy and law.

Initial Observations

The strongest current OpenETR alignment is likely with articles focused on electronic receipt identity, control, integrity evidence, transfer of control, lifecycle evidence, surrender/presentation-style actions, encumbrance evidence, discharge evidence, and queryable state.

The project does not yet attempt to satisfy article 10 as a structured warehouse receipt schema. Today, examples/MLWR001.pdf and uploaded receipt documents are treated as signed/digested event data rather than parsed structured receipt fields.

The project also does not yet decide protected-holder status, priority, enforcement, operator liability, warehouse care duties, or local-law effectiveness. Those should be modelled as recognition rules, attestations, external registry references, or policy profiles layered on top of the OpenETR evidence chain.