OpenETR Evidence Graph Infographic¶
This infographic ties together the main OpenETR design idea:
Signed, linked evidence forms an Evidence Graph. Defined rules derive Consequential State, while a Control Graph is the subset relevant to controller and control-transition consequences.
The Mermaid diagram below is the current editable source model.
flowchart TB
subgraph Domain["Domain Adapters"]
MLWR["MLWR Control Desk<br/>warehouse receipt workflows"]
MLETR["MLETR / Bills of Lading<br/>transport document workflows"]
OTHER["Other Domains<br/>credentials, certificates, records"]
end
subgraph Control["OpenETR Protocol Layer"]
GRAPH["Evidence Graph<br/>linked evidence records for one artifact"]
CONTROL_GRAPH["Control Graph<br/>control-related subset"]
ORIGIN["Anchor Records<br/>kind 1415"]
CONTROL_EVENTS["Evidence Records<br/>kind 1416"]
STATE["Derived State<br/>controller, lifecycle, encumbrances"]
end
subgraph Nostr["Nostr Event Substrate"]
EVENTS["Signed Events<br/>event id + signature"]
TAGS["Wire Tags<br/>o, e, p, action, enc"]
RELAYS["Relay Pool<br/>publish, retrieve, replicate"]
VERIFY["Independent Verification<br/>signatures, ids, linked e chain"]
end
subgraph Identity["Identity and System Integration"]
USER["Authenticated System User<br/>account, SSO, operator login"]
ROOT["Root Key<br/>integration master key"]
PROFILE["Operational Profiles<br/>warehouse, carrier, bank, consignee"]
SIGNER["Profile Signer<br/>nsec / npub"]
end
subgraph Recognition["Recognition Layer"]
POLICY["Verifier Policy<br/>law, contract, registry, institution"]
EFFECT["Recognized Effect<br/>holder, transfer, pledge, discharge"]
end
MLWR --> GRAPH
MLETR --> GRAPH
OTHER --> GRAPH
GRAPH --> ORIGIN
GRAPH --> CONTROL_EVENTS
GRAPH --> CONTROL_GRAPH
ORIGIN --> STATE
CONTROL_EVENTS --> STATE
ORIGIN --> EVENTS
CONTROL_EVENTS --> EVENTS
EVENTS --> TAGS
TAGS --> RELAYS
RELAYS --> VERIFY
VERIFY --> GRAPH
USER --> ROOT
ROOT --> PROFILE
PROFILE --> SIGNER
SIGNER --> ORIGIN
SIGNER --> CONTROL_EVENTS
STATE --> POLICY
VERIFY --> POLICY
POLICY --> EFFECT
Reading The Diagram¶
The Evidence Graph is the signed evidence structure formed by an Anchor Record and later linked Evidence Records. The Control Graph is the subset used to derive controller or control-transition state.
The Digital Artifact can itself be a record, such as a warehouse receipt, bill of lading, certificate, or credential. OpenETR keeps that artifact distinct from the signed evidence records that concern it.
Nostr provides the event substrate below the graph:
- event ids bind the serialized event data
- signatures bind events to profile public keys
- tags provide object identity, participant references, and chain links
- relays provide open publication and retrieval
- verifiers can independently check the chain without trusting the original application
Domain adapters sit above the graph. They make OpenETR usable in specific domains without changing the generic protocol.
For example, the MLWR adapter can speak in terms of:
- create receipt evidence record
- transfer receipt
- pledge or restrict receipt
- release encumbrance
- present for delivery
- complete delivery
Those actions translate into generic OpenETR Anchor Events and later Evidence Events.
Identity and system integration sit beside the graph. An existing system may authenticate its own users however it already does, then use a root-and-profile model to connect those users to OpenETR signing profiles.
The root key is an integration and administration key. It can organize profile keys, recover configuration, and hide OpenETR key management behind an ordinary account-based system. Operational profiles then sign the actual OpenETR events.
The recognition layer is deliberately separate. The verified graph proves signed structure, provenance, and event history. The verifier's policy determines legal, institutional, contractual, or operational effect.
Design Implication¶
OpenETR does not require all participants to share one application, database, registry, or legal policy.
Different systems can:
- publish and retrieve the same signed event graph
- verify the same Nostr wire-format evidence
- present domain-specific workflows through their own adapters
- connect authenticated users to profile signers through their own account systems
- apply their own recognition policy to determine effect
This is the core portability claim: the control evidence is shared and cryptographic, while the applications, domains, identities, and recognition rules can remain independently operated.