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OpenETR Generic Transfer Model

This note defines how OpenETR's protocol layer supports transfer of control over a Digital Artifact by preserving Evidence Graph records and applying state transition rules.

It is intended to describe control over a transferable electronic record in a way that remains independent of:

  • any specific commercial domain
  • any specific legal recognition regime
  • any specific protocol implementation

OpenETR is not a Recognition Layer system. It does not itself provide ownership, title, contractual rights, priority, mandate, or legal effect. It preserves an Evidence Graph concerning a Digital Artifact and supports validation of that Evidence Graph under an applicable policy. Consequential state is the result of that validation.

Purpose

OpenETR provides a protocol layer for electronic transferable records.

Its purpose is to make the Evidence Graph records, validation policy, and resulting consequential state concerning a Digital Artifact independently verifiable.

It does not determine:

  • ownership
  • title
  • contractual rights
  • mandate
  • legal effect

Those matters belong to the Recognition Layer.

Core Primitives

Byte Identity

Byte identity is the identity of digital content as determined by its exact byte sequence. In the current OpenETR binding, byte identity is expressed as the SHA-256 digest of those bytes.

If a PDF is stamped, metadata is added, an image is re-encoded, a JSON package is serialized differently, or any byte changes for any reason, the result has a different byte identity and is a different Digital Artifact for OpenETR purposes.

Byte identity is not visual, semantic, legal, or document-system identity. Two files may look the same or represent the same business record while having different byte identities. OpenETR can link related artifacts through Evidence Events, but it does not collapse distinct byte sequences into one artifact.

Digital Artifact

A Digital Artifact is persistent digital content with byte identity. In the current implementation, that identity is the SHA-256 digest of the artifact's exact bytes.

The Digital Artifact:

  • is uniquely identified by the SHA-256 digest of its exact bytes;
  • is the common subject referenced by candidate assertions and Evidence Events;
  • may have incomplete, invalid, competing, ambiguous, or terminated event history; and
  • becomes a Digital Original when validation of its Evidence Graph under an applicable policy establishes consequential state.

Evidence Graph

An Evidence Graph is one end-verifiable record or a graph of related end-verifiable records concerning the Digital Artifact. The Evidence Graph is the control evidence structure, not the artifact itself.

In OpenETR, the proof is outside the artifact. The Digital Artifact remains the byte-identifiable content; the Evidence Graph is the separate signed evidence concerning that content. Implementations should not require the artifact bytes to be modified, wrapped, watermarked, or re-minted in order to carry OpenETR proof. This makes OpenETR format agnostic: the same evidence model can apply to PDFs, images, JSON documents, credentials, document bundles, media files, or future formats without embedding OpenETR-specific proof into each format.

This separation is central to the recognition boundary. OpenETR can publish, retrieve, and validate signed evidence of control-related events, but it does not universally enforce transferability or legal effect. A verifier, registry, platform, court, counterparty, or other relying party applies its policy to decide whether a particular Evidence Graph is recognized for a particular purpose.

Evidence And Disclosure

Verifiable evidence establishes the propositions required by an identified ruleset; it need not always disclose all underlying information. Future profiles may accept privacy-preserving proofs of particular propositions, provided their scope, artifact and event binding, verification dependencies, and sufficiency can be independently checked. This does not relax existing signed-event requirements or add private-proof support to the base ruleset.

Artifact identification requires exact bytes and their digest, not semantic interpretation. No implicit normalization or metadata stripping occurs. Related representations require separate evidence and profile semantics.

See Private Evidence And Verified Propositions for the design boundary, coverage limitations, and privacy considerations.

Current Controller

For a valid, complete, unambiguous, and active candidate graph, an applicable validation policy may produce exactly one Participant as the Current Controller. A Digital Artifact does not necessarily have a resulting Current Controller: the relevant event set may be absent, incomplete, invalid, conflicting, or terminated.

The Current Controller has the exclusive ability to:

  • transfer control
  • redeem the Digital Artifact
  • perform other authorized control actions

This is a Protocol Layer statement only. It does not by itself determine who owns the underlying asset or what legal consequences follow from control.

Control Graph

The Control Graph is the evidence-event portion of the Evidence Graph concerning the lifecycle of the Digital Artifact.

  • nodes represent Participants
  • directed edges represent authenticated Evidence Events
  • every event references the Digital Artifact
  • every event is cryptographically signed by the Participant performing the event

The graph provides evidence that a stated policy can validate to produce consequential state. A particular retrieved graph may be incomplete or may compete with another candidate graph.

Participants

A Participant is any identified entity capable of creating authenticated Evidence Events.

A Participant may assume one or more Control Roles:

  • Issuer
  • Current Controller
  • Transferor
  • Transferee
  • Attestor
  • Obligor
  • Redeemer
  • Relying Party

These are Control Roles only.

Commercial or institutional roles such as:

  • exporter
  • buyer
  • warehouse operator
  • bank
  • producer

exist outside the model.

Generic Evidence Events

ISSUE

Creates the first Evidence Graph record concerning a Digital Artifact. Validation of that one-record Evidence Graph under the applicable policy may establish initial consequential state.

An ISSUE event:

  • establishes the initial Current Controller
  • initializes the Control Graph

TRANSFER

Transfers exclusive control from the Current Controller to another Participant.

A TRANSFER event:

  • changes the Current Controller
  • appends a Transfer event to the Control Graph

ATTEST

Adds an authenticated assertion relating to the Digital Artifact.

Examples include:

  • custody
  • inspection
  • quality
  • quantity
  • certification

Attestations do not change the Current Controller.

An attestation may provide evidence about an event, a graph observation, an audit procedure, a witness statement, or external evidence. The attestor does not thereby become:

  • the controller;
  • the author of the underlying event;
  • the source of Consequential State;
  • a canonical registry; or
  • a recognition authority.

An attestation should identify the specific event, graph commitment, evidence bundle, or observation to which it applies and describe the claim or procedure being attested. Its signature proves attribution of that assertion. Defined rules determine what the attestation contributes to Consequential State, and an external recognition context determines what effect it receives.

ENCUMBER

Records an authenticated declaration of an encumbrance affecting the Digital Artifact.

Examples include:

  • pledge
  • security right
  • lien
  • restriction

OpenETR records the declaration but does not determine:

  • legal validity
  • perfection
  • priority
  • legal effect

DISCHARGE

Records the authenticated release or satisfaction of a previously declared encumbrance.

REDEEM

Records that the Current Controller has presented the Digital Artifact to the Obligor and requested performance.

TERMINATE

Records that the Obligor has completed performance and that the Digital Artifact has reached the end of its OpenETR lifecycle.

No further evidence events may occur after termination.

Endorsement and Indorsement

OpenETR does not define endorsement or indorsement as a separate universal Evidence Event type.

Instead, where relevant, endorsement or indorsement is expressed as an attestation associated with an underlying OpenETR event, with its legal or commercial characterization determined by the applicable recognition framework.

In the generic model:

  • if the relevant action changes the Current Controller, it is modeled as TRANSFER
  • if the relevant action adds authenticated meaning, authority, approval, instruction, limitation, or another assertion without itself changing control, it is modeled as ATTEST

Whether those events amount to an endorsement or indorsement is determined outside the Protocol Layer by the relevant Recognition Layer, contractual framework, or governing law.

Generic State Model

PRE-ISSUANCE
      |
      | ISSUE
      v
ACTIVE
      |
      |-- ATTEST
      |-- TRANSFER
      |-- ENCUMBER
      |-- DISCHARGE
      |
      v
ACTIVE
      |
      |-- REDEEM
      v
REDEMPTION PENDING
      |
      |-- TERMINATE
      v
TERMINATED

ATTEST, TRANSFER, ENCUMBER, and DISCHARGE may occur multiple times throughout the ACTIVE state.

Architectural Boundary

OpenETR records authenticated facts.

It answers:

  • What is the Digital Artifact and what Evidence Graph concerns it?
  • Who is the Current Controller?
  • Who made which authenticated assertions?
  • How has control evolved?

It does not answer:

  • Who owns the underlying asset?
  • Has title passed?
  • Is a security right legally perfected?
  • Which party has priority?
  • What contractual rights exist?

Those questions are determined by the applicable Recognition Layer, for example:

  • MLWR
  • MLETR
  • UCC Article 12
  • contract law
  • other governing legal frameworks

Design Principle

OpenETR provides authenticated evidence of control.

Commercial relationships and legal consequences remain outside the Protocol Layer.

Some implementation profiles may choose to recognize certain effects, especially transfers among a small and otherwise trusted set of counterparties, without separate third-party attestation at the time of transfer.

Where that occurs, recognition arises from the participants' own trust relationship and agreed policy rather than from the stronger OpenETR model of independently attestable evidence.

In such a simplified local-recognition profile, ordinary transfers may be recognized without separate attestation, although a specific attestation may still be used where the parties want to attach additional meaning, instruction, endorsement, or indorsement to a particular event.

That may be operationally acceptable for a narrower environment, but it provides a weaker foundation for independent verification, broad portability, and later dispute resolution.

As the model scales outward, parties may increasingly require attestation in order to rely on actions taken by participants with whom they do not share the same direct trust relationship.

In some settings, attestation may additionally be required for legal effect, institutional acceptance, or official recognition.

OpenETR should therefore be understood as supporting a spectrum from simplified local recognition, to selective event-level attestation, to fuller attested models designed for broader reliance and recognition.

Independent witnesses and auditors may strengthen evidence about an event or observed history without becoming controllers or protocol authorities. A profile may require such attestations, source comparison, or monitoring. The generic OpenETR action model does not require a transparency log, auditor network, or monitoring service.

The same generic model applies regardless of whether the Digital Artifact represents:

  • a warehouse receipt
  • a bill of lading
  • a promissory note
  • a certificate
  • a ticket
  • a digital asset entitlement
  • another transferable record

Interpretation

This model is intended to be protocol-neutral and recognition-neutral.

It is compatible with the broader three-layer framing in which:

  • the Protocol Layer establishes correctness
  • the Protocol Layer establishes authenticated control relationships
  • the Recognition Layer assigns legal, commercial, institutional, or social effect

Under that framing, OpenETR belongs to the Protocol Layer. It preserves a durable, signed, and reviewable history of control without collapsing control into either protocol mechanics or legal recognition.