OpenETR Nostr Wire Format Specification¶
This document defines the current OpenETR Nostr wire format.
Its purpose is to express the OpenETR protocol model as concrete Nostr events, kinds, and tags so that implementations can:
- publish interoperable OpenETR events
- query and traverse OpenETR control history
- distinguish wire-level validity from later recognition or policy
Status¶
Draft.
This is a current working specification for the OpenETR reference direction. It reflects the present 1415 / 1416 regular-event split and current tag conventions. It should not yet be treated as a final permanent registry decision.
The OpenETR reference app implements the optional blossom Anchor Event hint
convention using Stroma's BlossomPool: opt-in artifact storage precedes signing,
and retrieval combines verified anchor hints with configured servers.
Existing anchors without hints remain compatible.
The inspection action and encrypted-report/key-reference conventions below are
draft extensions, not claims of current implementation support. See
Inspection Evidence.
Scope¶
This specification defines:
- current event-kind assignments
- the meaning of the core OpenETR tags
- minimum wire-level event shapes
- object-history query and traversal expectations
- the distinction between wire format and recognition
This specification does not by itself determine:
- ownership
- title
- mandate
- legal effect
- priority
- recognition policy
Those remain outside the wire format and are determined by the applicable OpenETR policy, attestation, and recognition framework.
Nostr carries the events. OpenETR determines their consequences. Relays transport and preserve signed evidence; they do not determine OpenETR consequential state.
Key-Based Identifier Mapping¶
A Key-Based Identifier (KBI) is an identifier whose canonical value is public-key verification material or a deterministic encoding of that material. A KBI identifies a signing key; it does not, by itself, establish actor identity, authority, role, or recognition.
In this binding, the 32-byte Nostr public key is the KBI. Its 64-character
lowercase hexadecimal representation is the canonical wire encoding used in
NIP-01 events and relay filters. npub is the NIP-19 human-readable encoding
of the same KBI.
Event Families¶
The current OpenETR wire format uses two event families:
kind 1415for the Anchor Eventkind 1416for later Evidence Events
Both are regular events. Addressable or replaceable events are not part of the OpenETR Evidence Graph.
Byte Identity¶
OpenETR uses byte identity for the Digital Artifact: the identity of the artifact is derived from its exact bytes. In this Nostr binding, byte identity is carried as the 64-character lowercase SHA-256 digest of those bytes.
If the bytes change, the byte identity changes. A visually identical PDF, a
re-encoded image, or a differently serialized data package may therefore be a
different Digital Artifact at the protocol layer. Related artifacts can be
linked by Evidence Events, but they do not share the same o value unless
their bytes produce the same digest.
1415 Anchor Event¶
The Anchor Event is the first candidate Evidence Graph record concerning a Digital Artifact.
Evidence Graph is the protocol evidence term: it is one
end-verifiable event or a graph of related events concerning the Digital
Artifact identified by the o digest. An Evidence Graph is not the artifact and does not,
by itself, assert derived or recognized consequential state.
Its current wire-level role is to:
- bind the Digital Artifact byte identity into the OpenETR event graph
- provide the candidate evidence from which an identified ruleset may derive initial anchored state
- provide the starting point for Publisher Notice chains and extension graphs
A valid Anchor Event forms a one-record candidate Evidence Graph. Evaluation of that Evidence Graph under OpenETR Core Record Ruleset 1.0 establishes initial anchored Consequential State and brings the identified Digital Artifact into the OpenETR Digital Original model. The event does not by itself establish that the candidate is uniquely authoritative or compel recognition, standing, or legal or operational effect.
A single object digest may have more than one Anchor Event. Different issuers, systems, communities, or recognition contexts may anchor the same object. Verifiers should therefore treat each 1415 event as a candidate anchor and apply the relevant recognition profile to decide which anchor, if any, is authoritative for the purpose at hand.
1416 Evidence Event Family¶
The Evidence Event family extends the Evidence Graph with signed evidence of later actions concerning the same Digital Artifact. Some actions change control; others contribute evidence from which different Consequential State may be derived.
In the current working model, 1416 is a shared action family rather than a single semantic event type.
The action is carried by the action tag.
Current working 1416 actions are:
initiateacceptterminateattestnoticeencumberdischargeredeem
Proposed extension action: inspection. Its draft definition below does not
imply support in the reference CLI or core verifier.
The current reference CLI command mapping is summarized in OPENETR_CLI_IMPLEMENTATION_WALKTHROUGH.md. Publisher Notice publication is specified by Core Record Ruleset 1.0 but is not yet exposed by the reference CLI.
Core Tag Model¶
The current OpenETR wire format uses the following core tags.
OpenETR distinguishes between:
- tags used as relay query anchors
- tags used as signed structured event data
- event
contentused as human-readable narrative or unstructured context
Only the first category requires relay indexing support.
Nostr relay filters express tag queries with leading # keys, such as #o, #e, or #p.
OpenETR therefore uses short, stable tags such as o, e, and p for object identity, graph traversal, and participant lookup.
OpenETR also uses named tags such as name, size_bytes, digest_generated_at, domain, document_type, record_reference, record_description, or blossom for structured metadata that does not need to be relay-queryable.
Those named tags are still part of the signed event. They should be read from the event tag list after the event has been retrieved through the core query anchors. Implementations should not need to parse the content field to recover structured OpenETR metadata.
The recommended convention is:
- use core single-letter tags for lookup and traversal
- use named tags for signed structured metadata
- use
contentfor readable summaries, comments, or other unstructured event data
o¶
o is the Digital Artifact byte identity carried forward across the full Evidence Graph history.
In the current model:
o = <object_hex>
The o tag carries the SHA-256 digest of the artifact's exact bytes and is the primary object-centric query anchor for both Anchor Events and later Evidence Events.
The o tag is a relay-query anchor. It should not be confused with the 1415 Anchor Event, which is a signed event in the control graph.
e¶
e links an Evidence Event to the prior event in the candidate Evidence Graph.
In the current model, e should reference:
- the Anchor Event id for the first later Evidence Event
- the immediately prior control-relevant event for later actions in the chain
This is the primary chain-traversal link.
For the draft inspection extension, the predecessor may instead be an anchor, inspection, or notice. This is an evidence relationship, not necessarily a control transition. All ancestry retains the same artifact digest; the extension defines admissible paths and separates inspector notices from core Anchor Publisher notices.
No separate origin or anchor tag is required. A verifier identifies the
Anchor Event by following the signed e references backward until the chain
terminates at a valid kind 1415 event carrying the same o value. An
implementation may encounter an origin tag on early OpenETR events, but it
is non-normative and should not be relied upon for graph reconstruction.
p¶
p identifies another participant relevant to the event.
Examples in the current model:
- transfer initiate: the transferee pubkey
- transfer accept: the accepted transfer counterparty where the implementation includes it
- encumber: the beneficiary or secured party
- redeem: the obligor
- attest: an optional subject or referenced participant
The exact semantics of p are action-dependent.
action¶
action distinguishes the semantic subtype within the 1416 Evidence Event family.
Examples:
["action", "initiate"]["action", "accept"]["action", "terminate"]["action", "attest"]["action", "notice"]["action", "encumber"]["action", "discharge"]["action", "redeem"]
Other Action-Specific Tags¶
The current working model may also use action-specific tags where needed.
Examples:
["enc", "<encumbrance_event_id_hex>"]for a discharge event["type", "<subtype>"]for attestation or encumbrance typing["notice_type", "<publisher_position>"]for a Publisher Notice["ref", "<external_reference>"]for external linkage
Current reference CLI usage:
| Tag | Used by | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
enc |
openetr discharge |
event id of the encumbrance being discharged |
type |
openetr attest, openetr encumber |
action-specific subtype such as attestation type or encumbrance type |
ref |
openetr attest, openetr encumber, openetr discharge, openetr redeem |
external reference or business reference |
These tags are part of the working wire convention. Their legal or operational effect depends on the applicable recognition profile.
Optional GS1 Product Association¶
For kind 1415 Anchor Events carrying a GS1 product association, new publishers
MUST encode the GTIN as a single g tag containing the canonical 14 ASCII digits,
including meaningful leading zeros and a valid GS1 check digit:
["g", "09520123456788"]
This is an optional domain convention, not a requirement for every OpenETR anchor
and not a definition of g across all Nostr kinds. Under NIP-01, single-letter
tags are expected to be indexed by relays; only the first value is indexed.
Product discovery can therefore use:
{"kinds": [1415], "#g": ["09520123456788"]}
The o tag remains the exact artifact digest. g identifies the asserted product
class, not unique artifact bytes or necessarily an individual physical item.
Optional lot and serial values remain named tags gs1_lot and gs1_serial;
absent optional values MUST be omitted. The application domain defines their
validation and meaning. These tags and g are covered by the event signature.
The optional gs1_expiry tag carries the exact six-digit GS1 AI 17 expiry value
in YYMMDD, for example ["gs1_expiry", "270131"]. It MUST occur at most once,
be validated under applicable GS1/domain date rules, and be omitted when absent.
It is named metadata, not a required relay index. Exact matching preserves the
encoded digits; date interpretation and current-expiry decisions remain separate.
Readers MUST NOT silently treat a missing expiry as a match to a scanned expiry.
Separate anchors MAY associate different lot/expiry combinations with artifacts;
the combination is not a uniqueness constraint and does not replace earlier
events. See the scanner acquisition and discovery specification
for #g discovery, qualifier matching, date handling, and safebox-web integration.
Readers MUST continue to accept legacy gs1_gtin in place of g. When both are
present, each MUST occur once and their canonical values MUST be identical.
Repeated, malformed, or conflicting association tags MUST NOT be silently
selected or used to claim a verified GS1 association. This failure does not
erase the event or invalidate unrelated artifact evidence. New publishers use
g only, not both aliases. Existing signed events MUST NOT be edited in place.
Legacy events carrying only gs1_gtin are not discoverable through #g alone;
digest-based #o retrieval remains compatible. Relay indexing support should be
tested. Query results still require event validation, expected-kind and digest
checks, and applicable recognition rules. A GTIN tag is a publisher assertion,
not proof of GS1 allocation, authorization, or physical authenticity.
See NIP-01 and the GS1 design note.
Named Structured Metadata Tags¶
Named metadata tags may be used when an implementation wants to carry signed structured data without requiring relay-level filtering on that data.
Examples for an Anchor Event may include:
["name", "MLWR001.pdf"]["digest_generated_at", "2026-07-10T12:00:00+00:00"]["size_bytes", "282796"]["record_reference", "MLWR001"]["record_description", "Stored goods described in the receipt"]
Examples for domain or policy context may include:
["domain", "mlwr"]["document_type", "warehouse_receipt"]["schema", "<schema_identifier_or_uri>"]["schema_digest", "<schema_digest_hex>"]
These tags are:
- signed by the event author
- available to any verifier that retrieves the event
- useful for structured display, validation, policy mapping, and domain adapters
- not assumed to be relay-indexed unless an implementation explicitly chooses and tests relay support
Implementations should treat these named tags as structured event data.
The content field should not be the primary machine interface for such data. It is reserved for readable narrative, comments, or unstructured context that helps a person understand the event after the structured tags have been read.
Artifact Retrieval¶
Blossom Retrieval Hints¶
An Anchor Event MAY carry zero or more optional blossom tags:
["blossom", "https://blossom.example.org"]
Each tag has exactly two string elements: the tag name and a Blossom server origin. Publishers MUST use an absolute HTTPS origin, with no credentials, non-root path, query, or fragment. A port MAY be specified. Publishers SHOULD normalize the scheme and hostname to lowercase, omit the default HTTPS port and trailing slash, and emit at most one tag per normalized origin. Readers SHOULD accept a root trailing slash and normalize equivalent origins before deduplicating them. Plain HTTP or private storage may be configured locally, but is not advertised by this interoperable public-hint convention.
Repeat the tag for multiple locations; do not put a comma-separated server
list in a single tag. The value is a server origin, not a complete blob URL
or another artifact identifier. The candidate blob locator is constructed as
<server-origin>/<o-digest>. The o tag remains the canonical byte identity.
blossom is signed structured metadata, not a relay-query anchor. No
#blossom indexing or filtering support is required. Retrieve the Anchor
Event through #o and read its tag list, not its content.
Publication And Confirmation¶
When an issuance workflow requests Blossom storage, it MUST finish its
storage-confirmation step before constructing the final anchor tags and
signing the Anchor Event. A server MUST be advertised only after a GET
from that origin returns bytes whose SHA-256 matches o. This applies both
to new uploads and to copies already available at the server. A successful
PUT response or HEAD response alone is not digest-verified read-back.
For the reference publication workflow, the storage success requirement is
selected locally from the following options, defaulting to any:
| Requirement | Confirmed locations required for N unique target origins |
|---|---|
any |
1 |
half |
ceil(N / 2) |
majority |
floor(N / 2) + 1 |
all |
N |
An empty target set is an error when storage is requested. Deduplicate the targets before calculating N; unavailable, rejected, and unconfirmed targets remain in the denominator. Distinct origins need not be independently operated. These are availability-confirmation thresholds, not consensus or independent custodian guarantees. The selected threshold is not a new wire tag and cannot be inferred from the number of hints in an anchor.
The workflow MUST report whether the requirement was met and the individual outcomes. If it was not met, it MUST NOT silently proceed with automatic anchor publication as though storage succeeded. An explicit application decision may instead proceed without the requested storage assurance; it must not turn unconfirmed locations into confirmed hints. Issuing an anchor without requesting Blossom storage remains valid.
After the requirement is met, the workflow SHOULD include every confirmed location it intends to advertise, not only enough locations to meet the threshold. Rejected or unconfirmed uploads MUST NOT be represented as confirmed locations. An upload timeout is ambiguous: the workflow SHOULD attempt digest-verified retrieval before considering another upload.
A hint is the publisher's signed retrieval suggestion. It is not independent proof that a read-back occurred, that a server physically retains a copy, or that the artifact will remain available. Neither the tag nor a server response establishes ownership, authority, retention, control, recognition, or effect.
Resolver Behavior¶
Resolvers SHOULD combine locally configured servers with permitted hints
from signature- and event-ID-verified candidate anchors carrying the requested
o value, then normalize and deduplicate them. Choosing which candidate
anchors and destinations to use remains application policy. No particular
server ordering is implied by tag order.
Resolvers MUST verify the returned bytes against the requested o digest
before treating them as the Digital Artifact. The first verified copy is
sufficient for byte retrieval; storage thresholds do not require downloading
a quorum of copies. A missing file, timeout, or digest mismatch at one server
SHOULD allow attempts at other permitted locations.
Signed hints remain untrusted network destinations. Implementations MUST apply destination policy and resource limits before fetching, including protection against private-network requests, DNS rebinding, and unsafe redirects. A resolver may reject redirects altogether. It MUST NOT forward credentials or upload authorization tokens to hinted retrieval destinations. Digest verification does not make a file or its declared media type safe to render; normal content-handling safeguards still apply.
Malformed or disallowed optional hints SHOULD be ignored with a diagnostic; they do not by themselves invalidate otherwise valid Evidence Graph records. Failure to retrieve the artifact MUST be reported separately from failure to retrieve or verify its Anchor Event and Evidence Events. It is not proof that the artifact never existed, that the Evidence Graph is invalid, or that control changed.
Compatibility And Immutability¶
Anchors without blossom tags remain valid and use configured servers,
archives, local copies, or other permitted artifact-retrieval mechanisms.
Older readers may ignore the optional tag. Evidence Events need not repeat
anchor hints; this convention introduces no new action or event kind.
Hints in an existing signed Anchor Event cannot be edited. Adding or changing a hint changes the event ID and produces a different candidate anchor; it does not update the old anchor or its linked graph. Implementations MUST NOT silently reissue an anchor solely to refresh its storage locations. Local resolver configuration can evolve without changing artifact identity or the Evidence Graph. A future signed locator-update convention would require a separate design.
Example Anchor Fields¶
This fragment omits the standard Nostr author, timestamp, event ID, and signature fields; it is not a complete signed event:
{
"kind": 1415,
"tags": [
["o", "72f268d79dc36412a21d046cc2124b9ca02aab3c712eb23e67fd96d86a38e38f"],
["action", "issue"],
["name", "receipt.pdf"],
["blossom", "https://blossom.example.org"],
["blossom", "https://backup.example.org"]
],
"content": "Anchored the digital artifact."
}
The two locations are hints for the same exact bytes. They do not represent two artifacts, two anchors, or two votes about consequential state.
Minimum Event Shapes¶
The wire-level event structures below define the current minimum working format.
Anchor Event¶
kind = 1415- required tags:
["o", "<object_hex>"]["action", "issue"]- current implementation structured tags:
["name", "<source_name>"]["digest_generated_at", "<iso_8601_timestamp>"]["size_bytes", "<decimal_byte_count>"]- optional structured tags:
["blossom", "<https_server_origin>"], repeated for multiple optional retrieval hints- profile or identity tags such as
display_name,lei, or related metadata where a given implementation chooses to include them - document metadata tags such as
record_referenceorrecord_description - domain tags such as
domain,document_type,schema, orschema_digest
Recommended content convention:
- a short human-readable summary of the anchor or issue event
- no required machine parsing
- structured values are carried in tags
Control meaning:
- creates the first candidate Evidence Graph record concerning the Digital Artifact
- establishes the initial anchored control state
- establishes the starting point for later control traversal
Compatibility note:
- the current Nostr binding still uses
["action", "issue"]onkind 1415 - this tag should be read as the current wire action label for anchoring or issuance, not as a claim of universal recognition or external effect
Recognition boundary:
- provides a one-record candidate Evidence Graph from which policy validation may produce consequential state, without deciding external recognition or effect
- does not, by itself, determine legal authority, ownership, title, mandate, priority, or effect
- may be one of several candidate Anchor Events for the same object digest
Transfer Initiate Event¶
kind = 1416- required tags:
["o", "<object_hex>"]["e", "<prior_event_id_hex>"]["p", "<transferee_pubkey_hex>"]["action", "initiate"]
Control meaning:
- declares an intended transfer of control
- does not by itself settle whether the transfer is recognized as effective
Transfer Accept Event¶
kind = 1416- required tags:
["o", "<object_hex>"]["e", "<initiate_event_id_hex_or_prior_control_event_id_hex>"]["action", "accept"]- recommended tags:
["p", "<transferor_or_related_counterparty_pubkey_hex>"]
Control meaning:
- records acceptance of a transfer
- may be required by policy before a transfer is recognized as effective
Terminate Event¶
kind = 1416- required tags:
["o", "<object_hex>"]["e", "<prior_control_event_id_or_anchor_event_id>"]["action", "terminate"]
Control meaning:
- records termination of the active OpenETR lifecycle for the object
- prevents later control transitions if the event is recognized as effective
Attest Event¶
kind = 1416- required tags:
["o", "<object_hex>"]["e", "<specific_event_id_being_attested>"]["action", "attest"]- optional tags:
["type", "<attestation_type>"]["p", "<subject_pubkey_hex>"]["ref", "<external_reference>"]
Control meaning:
- records an authenticated assertion relating to the object or a control-relevant event
- targets the specific Anchor Event or evidence event identified by the
etag - does not by itself change the Current Controller
Publisher Notice¶
kind = 1416- required tags:
["o", "<object_hex>"]["e", "<anchor_event_id_or_prior_notice_event_id>"]["action", "notice"]["notice_type", "<publisher_position>"]- optional tags:
["severity", "<information_warning_or_critical>"]["effective_at", "<publisher_declared_time>"]["reason_code", "<structured_reason>"]["ref", "<external_reference>"]["successor", "<successor_artifact_digest>"]
State meaning:
- records the Anchor Publisher's signed position concerning the artifact
- must be signed by the Anchor Publisher to qualify under Core Record Ruleset 1.0
- does not erase or replace the Anchor Event
- does not by itself establish external validity, recognition, or effect
- does not by itself change the Current Controller
The normative notice vocabulary and state-derivation rules are defined in OPENETR_CORE_RECORD_RULESET_1_0.md.
Inspection Event (Draft Extension)¶
kind = 1416- exactly one each:
o,e,action=inspection, andrelation relation:assesses,supplements,corrects, orsupersedes- optional report tags:
report_digest,report_url,ciphertext_digest,encryption,key_ref, andkey_owner
The event adds a signed assessment. Its signer need not be the Anchor Publisher.
Neither the action nor a claimed supersession grants authority or changes
control automatically. The o value remains the anchored artifact digest,
not a cargo identifier or a separately referenced report digest.
key_ref identifies a separately encrypted content-key record within the owning
profile's scope; it contains no key and grants no access. If key_owner is
absent, the event signer is the owner. These named tags are not assumed to be
relay-indexed. Structured public metadata stays in tags; confidential report
content uses an explicitly identified encryption envelope.
Notices about inspections reuse action=notice and notice_type, but their
admissible ancestry and inspector-position derivation are extension behavior,
not changes to Core Record Ruleset 1.0. Full event, confidentiality, and
validation requirements are in
Inspection Evidence. Encryption envelope
profiles and private key-store event assignments remain pending.
Encumber Event¶
kind = 1416- required tags:
["o", "<object_hex>"]["e", "<prior_control_event_id_or_anchor_event_id>"]["action", "encumber"]["p", "<beneficiary_or_secured_party_pubkey_hex>"]- optional tags:
["type", "<encumbrance_type>"]["ref", "<external_reference>"]
Control meaning:
- records a claimed encumbrance affecting the object
- does not by itself change the Current Controller
Discharge Event¶
kind = 1416- required tags:
["o", "<object_hex>"]["e", "<prior_control_event_id_or_anchor_event_id>"]["action", "discharge"]["enc", "<encumbrance_event_id_hex>"]- optional tags:
["p", "<beneficiary_or_releasing_party_pubkey_hex>"]["ref", "<external_reference>"]
Control meaning:
- records release or satisfaction of a previously claimed encumbrance
- does not by itself change the Current Controller
Redeem Event¶
kind = 1416- required tags:
["o", "<object_hex>"]["e", "<prior_control_event_id_or_anchor_event_id>"]["action", "redeem"]["p", "<obligor_pubkey_hex>"]- optional tags:
["ref", "<presentation_or_claim_reference>"]
Control meaning:
- records presentation of the object to the obligor for performance
- does not by itself terminate the object
Query and Traversal Model¶
OpenETR wire-level evaluation is object-centric first.
Implementations should generally:
- determine the object digest
- query Anchor Events using
kind = 1415and#o - query evidence events using
kind = 1416and#o - group candidate chains by
ereferences - evaluate those chains under local validity and recognition rules
In current practice, the object digest is commonly queried through the o tag across both event families.
The reference openetr query command currently derives and displays:
- the candidate Anchor Event or events
- matching
kind 1416evidence events - summary control chains from linked
ereferences - lifecycle state
- current controller
- profile information where available
- encumbrance totals, discharged encumbrances, and outstanding encumbrances
The web app query result uses the same query service and should therefore expose the same derived object-state view.
Retrieval Coverage And EOSE Hints¶
Relay query completion is not equivalent to global evidence completeness.
Where a relay implements optional NIP-67 EOSE completeness hints, an OpenETR client should preserve the relay's observations:
| NIP-67 hint | OpenETR retrieval observation |
|---|---|
finish |
complete_for_source |
more |
more_available |
auth |
authentication_required |
| no conclusive hint | unknown_completeness |
finish means only that the relay reports having supplied every matching
stored event for that subscription. It does not prove that another relay,
archive, private repository, or unpublished source contains no additional or
conflicting event.
A client receiving more should paginate. A client receiving auth may use
NIP-42 authentication where appropriate and authorized. A client that cannot
complete pagination or authentication should preserve the events already
retrieved and report the retrieval limitation instead of silently treating
the result as complete.
OpenETR interoperable Evidence Graph records should continue to use dedicated event
kinds and semantics. Generic NIP-78 application-data kinds are not a substitute
for kinds 1415, 1416, or a future adopted linked-evidence kind.
Cryptographic Control Chain Verification¶
The OpenETR control chain is not database state maintained by a single application. It is a graph of signed Nostr events that any verifier can retrieve and independently evaluate.
For a candidate object history, an implementation should verify:
- the Anchor Event uses
kind = 1415and carries the expected object identifier ino - each later evidence event uses
kind = 1416 - each event signature is valid for the event author
- each event id matches the serialized event data under the Nostr event id rules
- each event has the required minimum tags for its event shape
- each event in the candidate chain carries the same
oobject identifier - each evidence event carries an
etag that points to the prior event being relied on - action-specific references such as
p,enc,type,notice_type, andrefare present where required by the action or local recognition profile - the linked chain can be replayed in order to derive lifecycle state, current controller, and outstanding control conditions
The e tag follows the Nostr convention for event references. In OpenETR, it is the primary cryptographic link between control-relevant events:
- for the first later evidence event,
eshould point to the Anchor Event - for later control-transition events,
eshould point to the immediately prior control-relevant event being extended - for attestations,
eshould point to the specific event being attested - for a Publisher Notice,
eshould point to the Anchor Event or immediately prior Publisher Notice - for discharges,
encidentifies the encumbrance being discharged, whileelinks the discharge into the current control chain
The chain therefore needs no separate root-pointer tag. A verifier recovers
the candidate Anchor Event by traversing e references to kind 1415 and
must not substitute an unverified origin or anchor tag for that traversal.
This produces an Evidence Graph: an independently verifiable sequence of signed statements
about the same Digital Artifact. A verifier can reject events with invalid
signatures, inconsistent artifact identifiers, missing required tags, or
broken e references without relying on the application that originally
displayed the state.
Cryptographic control-chain verification is still not the same thing as legal or operational recognition. After the chain is structurally verified, an implementation must apply the relevant recognition profile, domain adapter, policy rules, and applicable law to decide which structurally valid events are effective for a particular purpose.
Current Controller Implications¶
At the wire-format level, events express candidate control history.
The wire format alone does not guarantee:
- singularity
- exclusive control
- final authoritative recognition
Instead, implementations derive candidate controller state by traversing the linked event chain and then applying local recognition rules.
In the current working model:
- the Anchor Event identifies the initial issuer or controller position claimed by that event
- a recognized transfer initiate and transfer accept pair may move control
- a recognized termination event ends the active control lifecycle
- attestation, encumbrance, discharge, and redeem events do not by themselves change the Current Controller
Validity and Recognition¶
This wire format separates structural validity from recognition.
Wire-level validity concerns questions such as:
- does the event use the correct kind
- are the required tags present
- is the object identifier well formed
- is the event signature valid
- is the referenced prior event structurally coherent
- where structured metadata is required by a profile, is it present in tags rather than only embedded in
content
Recognition concerns questions such as:
- whether the signer was entitled to publish the action
- whether a transfer accept is required
- whether a transfer without attestation is sufficient in a narrow trusted-counterparty profile
- whether a termination should be recognized as effective
- whether actor legitimacy requirements have been satisfied
This wire format does not itself provide mandate or effect.
It provides the event structure and evidence from which mandate or effect may later be recognized under the applicable framework.
An event may therefore be:
- valid but not recognized
- recognized only under a specific policy profile
- invalid and therefore not capable of recognition
Regular-Event Rationale¶
OpenETR graph links commit to exact event ids. Anchor Events and Evidence Events therefore use regular event kinds so a later record always references the exact prior record on which it relies.
Rebroadcasting the exact same signed event preserves its event id. Publishing
different content produces a different event and does not replace or silently
relink the existing graph node. Missing records referenced by e shall be
reported as broken graph continuity.
Relay persistence alone is not the source of effect. Relay diversity, archives, exports, attestations, or local stores may still be needed to preserve a complete evidence set.
Relationship to Other Specifications¶
This specification is intended to consolidate the wire-level aspects of the current model.
Related documents include:
- OPENETR_CLI_IMPLEMENTATION_WALKTHROUGH.md
- OPENETR_GENERIC_VERIFIER_POLICY.md
- CANONICAL_ETR_TRANSACTION_SPEC.md
- EVENT_KIND_REGISTRY.md
- CONTROL_EVENT_MINIMUM_SHAPES.md
- OPENETR_IMPLEMENTATION_ALIGNMENT_NOTE.md
- TITLE_TRANSFER_AUTHORITY_REPLACEABLE_EVENT_SPEC.md
External Nostr inputs relevant to retrieval and private application data:
Summary¶
The current OpenETR Nostr wire format is defined by:
1415for Anchor Events1416for later evidence eventsoas the object-history anchoreas the control-chain linkactionas the semantic subtype within the evidence-event family- named non-indexed tags as the convention for signed structured metadata
- optional repeated
blossomtags as artifact-retrieval hints, without changing byte identity or control semantics contentas human-readable or unstructured event data
This provides a coherent current working format for publishing, querying, and traversing OpenETR control history over Nostr while leaving recognition, standing, mandate, attestation policy, and legal effect to higher layers.