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Root and Profile Identity Model

This note describes how OpenETR organizes independent Nostr identities into a root-and-profile operating model.

It is intended to clarify the distinction between:

  • cryptographic identity at the Nostr layer
  • role assignment inside the OpenETR component
  • operational signing authority for ETR events

Status

Draft, reflecting the current OpenETR relay-backed configuration model and CLI behavior.

Core Principle

Every OpenETR root or profile identity is an ordinary Nostr keypair.

At the Nostr layer:

  • each nsec / npub pair is cryptographically independent
  • there is no native parent-child relationship between keys
  • one key does not derive authority from another key merely because OpenETR labels it as a profile
  • relays see signed events from ordinary Nostr pubkeys

OpenETR adds an application-level organization model on top of those independent identities.

The root-and-profile model is therefore role-based, not key-type-based.

Actor Neutrality

OpenETR does not distinguish between human actors and agent actors in the root/profile model or in signed evidence events.

A root or profile npub identifies a cryptographic signer. A valid signature proves control of the corresponding private key for that event. It does not prove whether the key was operated by:

  • a human;
  • an autonomous or semi-autonomous agent;
  • a software service or deterministic workflow;
  • a managed or hardware signing service;
  • a mixed workflow in which an agent proposes and a human approves.

This is intentional. The nature of the operator, the accountable principal, the scope of delegated authority, and the legal or institutional effect of the event are external authorization and recognition concerns.

A host system or verifier policy may require attestations or linked evidence about an agent, provider, deployer, human approval, permission scope, or incident-response process. Those claims do not alter the cryptographic validity of the signer or create a different class of OpenETR identity.

The detailed rationale is documented in OPENETR_ACTOR_NEUTRAL_IDENTITY_DESIGN_NOTE.md.

Roles

A Nostr keypair may serve in one or more OpenETR roles.

Root Admin Identity

The root admin identity is the key used by the OpenETR component to manage an OpenETR environment.

Its responsibilities may include:

  • discovering relay-backed configuration
  • publishing and updating configuration records
  • managing the profile index
  • managing aliases
  • recovering profile configuration on another machine
  • encrypting, decrypting, or otherwise accessing profile signer material where the implementation supports that

The root identity is administrative. It is not automatically the signer of operational ETR events.

Profile Signer Identity

A profile signer identity is the key used to act as a named OpenETR profile. The profile may be operated by a person, service, agent, or controlled workflow.

Profile signers may publish operational events such as:

  • ETR origin or issue events
  • transfer initiate events
  • transfer accept events
  • attestation events
  • encumbrance events
  • discharge events
  • redemption events
  • termination events
  • profile metadata

When a command publishes an ETR event, the event is signed by the active profile signer unless a command explicitly overrides the signer.

Same Key, Different Roles

The same Nostr keypair may be used as both:

  • the root admin identity
  • an operational profile signer

This is allowed because the distinction is a role assignment made by OpenETR, not a different cryptographic key type.

For example, a solo or demonstration environment may use the root key as a profile signer for convenience.

However, using the same key for both roles weakens separation between administration and operational authorship.

In production-like usage, the recommended pattern is usually:

  • root admin key for configuration, recovery, and profile management
  • separate profile signer keys for day-to-day ETR event publication

Component-Level Organization

OpenETR may organize multiple independent profile signers under a single root identity.

This means the root identity has operational knowledge of, or access to, the profile set through OpenETR's relay-backed configuration model.

It does not mean that profile public keys are cryptographically subordinate to the root public key.

The relationship is created by the OpenETR component through signed, relay-backed configuration and profile-secret management.

In practical terms:

  • root controls the OpenETR environment
  • profiles act within OpenETR workflows
  • each profile remains an independent Nostr identity

Profiles, Aliases, And Known Entities

OpenETR uses several root-managed lists of npub values, but they do different jobs.

The practical distinction is:

Profiles are who this root can act as.
Aliases are what this root calls other npubs.
Known entities are which npubs this root is prepared to treat as familiar for baseline verifier warnings.

Concept Purpose Effect
Profile Operational signer identity organized by the root Can sign OpenETR events when selected as the active profile
Alias Human-friendly nickname for an npub Makes commands and displays easier; does not itself imply trust
Known entity Root-managed familiarity list for external or internal npubs Suppresses or changes unknown-entity verifier warnings depending on policy

Profiles are delegated or organized operational identities.

For example, warehouse, carrier, exporter, or bank may be profiles. When a profile is active, OpenETR commands sign operational events with that profile's signer key.

Aliases are convenience labels.

For example, consignee may be an alias for a counterparty npub. The alias helps the user avoid pasting long bech32 identifiers. It does not mean the counterparty is authorized, trusted, or recognized.

Known entities are verifier-policy inputs.

They work like an SSH known-hosts file. If a signer or participant appears in the signed OpenETR graph but is not in the root's known_entities record, a baseline verifier can warn that the entity is unfamiliar to this OpenETR environment. The event may still be cryptographically valid.

The same npub may appear in more than one category.

For example:

  • a profile signer may also have an alias;
  • a counterparty alias may also be added as a known entity;
  • a profile signer may be added to known entities so the verifier treats it as familiar in another context.

The categories should not be collapsed. They answer different questions:

  • Can I act as this identity? Profile.
  • What short name do I use for this identity? Alias.
  • Should this identity be treated as familiar during verification? Known entity.

Model Flexibility

The root-and-profile model is powerful because the root organizes access to identities without pretending to create their cryptographic authority.

At the Nostr layer, a profile key can exist independently before it is known to any OpenETR root. It may have its own public profile, history, counterparties, and operational reputation.

OpenETR can later add that profile signer to a root-managed environment by storing the profile configuration and encrypted signer material under the root's relay-backed configuration.

This means:

  • a profile can be created inside one OpenETR environment and later imported into another;
  • an existing external Nostr identity can become an OpenETR operational profile;
  • one administrative root can organize many operational profiles;
  • the same operational profile may be known to more than one administrative context where the signer secret has intentionally been shared;
  • existing systems can map their own account, tenant, role, or custody model onto OpenETR profiles.

The important principle is:

OpenETR does not pretend the root creates the identity. The root organizes access to identities.

That makes the model suitable for integration with existing systems while preserving independent signer attribution at the event layer.

Domain Terminology: Control Desk Key

Domain adapters may present the root admin identity using terminology that fits the user's operating context.

For the MLWR / warehouse receipt application, the root admin identity may be called a Control Desk Key.

This term is intended to make the root/profile model easier to understand in the warehouse receipt Control Desk:

  • the Control Desk is the warehouse receipt workspace or operating surface;
  • the Control Desk Key administers the desk;
  • Commitment Profiles are operational signers the desk can act as;
  • the Acting Profile is the selected Commitment Profile for the current action;
  • contacts are external parties the desk can address or transact with;
  • references are external recognition, assurance, registry, KYC, assessment, audit, attestation, or policy sources;
  • receipt evidence records are signed by the selected operational profile.

The term does not change the cryptographic model.

A Control Desk Key is still an OpenETR root admin identity. It does not derive profile keys, make profile keys cryptographically subordinate, or automatically make a profile legally recognized.

The useful operational distinction is:

root admin identity / Control Desk Key = manages configuration and Commitment Profiles
profile signer identity / Commitment Profile = signs operational OpenETR events
Acting Profile = selected Commitment Profile for the current operation
Contact = external party the desk can reference
Reference = external source the desk or verifier may consult for recognition context

Contacts and references are application-facing terms. Implementations may still store these concepts using lower-level records such as aliases, known entities, profile metadata, attestations, or policy configuration. The important model distinction is that contacts are addressable parties, while references are sources of recognition or assurance context.

The warehouse operator issuance use case documents this terminology in MLWR_WAREHOUSE_OPERATOR_ISSUANCE_USE_CASE.md.

CLI Semantics

The current CLI reflects this distinction through separate commands.

openetr whoami

whoami answers:

Which profile signer am I currently acting as?

It shows the active profile and its resolved signer pubkey.

This is the identity used by ordinary operational commands unless overridden.

Examples include:

  • openetr issue-etr
  • openetr transfer initiate
  • openetr transfer accept
  • openetr attest
  • openetr encumber
  • openetr discharge
  • openetr redeem
  • openetr terminate-etr

openetr root

root answers:

Which root admin identity controls this OpenETR environment, and which profiles are organized under it?

It shows the root admin pubkey, home relays, the profile set, and the active acting profile.

By default it should not expose secret keys.

If a command provides an explicit secret-display option, such as --nsec, that output should be treated as sensitive recovery material.

Authority Boundaries

The root identity's authority is administrative within the OpenETR component.

It does not automatically determine legal authority, title, mandate, or recognition.

Similarly, a profile signer can create signed operational events, but whether those events are recognized as effective depends on the relevant OpenETR policy, attestation model, institutional rules, or legal framework.

The same boundary applies to actor type. OpenETR does not treat a human-operated signature as inherently more valid than an agent-operated signature. A domain or organizational policy may impose different authorization, supervision, disclosure, or recognition requirements on those actors while evaluating the same signed evidence.

This note is therefore about OpenETR component organization, not about legal effect.

Summary

OpenETR profiles are ordinary independent Nostr identities organized by the OpenETR component under a root administrative identity.

The root may also be a profile, but root and profile are roles, not different cryptographic key classes.

Both roles are actor-neutral: the protocol identifies the signing key, while integrating systems determine who or what operates it and whether that operation is authorized and recognized.

The practical distinction is:

  • root: the identity that manages and recovers the OpenETR environment
  • profile: the identity that signs operational events
  • whoami: the active profile signer
  • root: the administrative identity and profile set